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ABSTRACT  
 
When refugees and migrants arrive in Europe, European states portray themselves as 
inadvertent hosts to unanticipated crises: well-intentioned, sorely-stretched, and attempting 
to negotiate a reasonable solution and find the middle ground between fairly balancing the 
needs of refugees and their own citizens. To the contrary, I argue that European states, like 
many other developed countries, themselves take part in creating conditions for 
displacement in the Third World. This is done through, among other things, international 
legal regimes for the global economy, trade, war, and the environmental. Although local 
factors also play an important role in Third World displacement, external interventions 
have a significant role to play and should be subject to equal scrutiny. For instance, climate 
change induced migration is attributable to the largest carbon emitters, and yet this group 
of states are unwilling to accept refugees from climate change. I argue that this mismatch 
between causation and responsibility is unsustainable and asylum policies aimed at 
containing refugees in the Third World through closed European borders, aid, and 
proposals for solely local solutions are highly misplaced. As European states continue to 
intervene deep into the economic, political and social sphere of Third World countries, they 
strip Third World states of their decision-making ability and impose policies in favour of 
affluent states, and uphold an international unequal system that lies at the core of 
displacement dynamics. Yet these dynamics are not reflected either in international refugee 
law or the other legal regimes governing war, economy, trade, or environment. This is 
because interventions are enabled through, among other things, international law itself; 
under the pretext of rectifying Third World problems. International law helps create a 
perception of the international as the saviour and the local as the problem. European and 
other developed states are able to obfuscate their roles in displacement and can deny 
responsibility for sheltering displaced people. Consequently, a global apartheid persists, 
where those who cause displacement maintain their vast privileges through international 
law, while most of the displaced that a just law should protect are left to suffer.   
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I. Introduction 
 
While not a new phenomenon, migrants and refugees have over the last year received 
vast amounts of media attention because over a million entered Europe and applied for 
asylum in this period.1 It is feared by politicians and citizens alike that they are placing a 
constraint on welfare systems, labour markets, and allegedly bringing unwanted cultural 
norms with them. As a consequence, major efforts are undertaken in order to find a 
solution for this change. The recent agreement between Turkey and the EU is an example 
of this, ensuring that displaced are contained outside of the continent. The sympathizers 
portray this as the only viable and feasible solution, taking into account the needs of those 
displaced while also claiming the inculpability of European states caught in such a 
challenging situation. But is this the only possible way of perceiving reality? I hold that it 
is not.  
 
I argue that European states, like many other developed countries, themselves take part in 
creating conditions for displacement in the Third World, while simultaneously refusing to 
take responsibility for them. I contend that this is enabled in two main ways: firstly, 
through reducing refugee law to a regime that considers only immediate and mostly local 
remedies and causes for displaced, and thus disconnecting it from other legal regimes; 
and secondly, by institutionalizing suffering through international law while portraying 
international law as neutral and fair, where the international is the saviour and the local 
the problem.  
 
As international refugee law (IRL) is the only international legal framework that actually 
grants the opportunity to enter and stay in another state, IRL will serve as my point of 
departure. While refugee law includes an element of responsibility through the principles 
of international cooperation, durable solutions, and responsibility (burden)-sharing, I will 
examine why such solutions are mostly focused on containing displaced in the Third 
                                                          
1 EUROSTAT, ASYLUM IN THE EU MEMBER STATES: RECORD NUMBER OF OVER 1.2 MILLION FIRST TIME 
ASYLUM SEEKERS REGISTERED IN 2015. SYRIANS, AFGHANS AND IRAQIS: TOP CITIZENSHIPS 1 (2016), 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7203832/3-04032016-AP-EN.pdf/ (last visited Apr 1, 
2016). 
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World and thus removing from sight external factors that I argue should also be 
scrutinized in relation to responsibility. In this regard, I will look at a number of sub-
disciplines in international law related to international financial institutions, trade, 
military intervention, and environmental law in order to discuss how these play an active 
part in creating conditions for economic and environmental instability, conflict, and 
human rights abuse in the Third World, which are all factors in causing population 
movement. Although international law places such causal factors in the background, the 
impact of these factors on displacement is well known.  
 
As will be explained in this thesis, the reasons why people are displaced are not clearly 
reflected through the ambit of IRL, and other international legal fields that govern some 
of the main causes of displacement – such as the global economy, environment, war, or 
human rights – these fields do not deal directly with displacement. Given the magnitude 
of displacement today, why is international legal discourse disconnected from the main 
reasons for mass displacement? What enables actors that have some responsibility for 
causing displacement to hide in the background while discussing refugee law and policy, 
when providing a remedy for harm done is a general principle of international law?2 
 
In addition to arguing that that there is international responsibility for displacement and 
international law helps to hide this, I aim to discuss why and in what way responsibility 
should matter. What consequences should making such connections more evident entail? 
What would it mean for European asylum and foreign policy? Would it require European 
states to widen their quotas for refugees and loosen up border controls? Or perhaps it 
shows the need for further reflections about relations of power as reflected in legal 
instruments, which are involved in creating displacement and may indeed be crucial to 
any potential solution. This would most likely result in an altered vision of the solutions 
                                                          
2 Chorzow Factory Case (Germany v Poland), P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17 (Sept. 13) (1928), 
http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1928.09.13_chorzow1.htm (last visited Jan 4, 2016); 
Robert McCorquodale, International Organisations and International Human Rights Law: One Giant Leap 
for Humankind, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POWER: PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL ORDER AND JUSTICE. 
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF COLINN WARBRICK. 141–164, 146–148 (Kaiyan Homi Kaikobad & Michael 
Bohlander eds., 2009). 
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that are currently in place, who they serve, and whether they are sustainable in the long 
term, for refugees and for European states and societies.  
 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters in addition to the conclusion. Chapter one 
explains the main thesis, the methodology as well as outlining the main terminology. 
Chapter two gives a general overview of refugees in numbers as well as countries of 
origin and destination. Chapter three outlines the main features of IRL as well as 
European policies with regards to admission of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees. It 
explains how IRL restricts protection to only a small group of displaced, while European 
states have created a wide range of measures intended to keep asylum seekers from 
reaching European territory or to ensure their prompt return. This allows European, and 
other, states to avoid dealing with them.  
 
Chapter four examines economic interventions by international financial institutions, and 
explores how these institutions, together with the powerful states controlling them, play a 
role in entrenching poverty and creating conditions for instability in the Third World, an 
important factor in migration. Chapter five deals with international trade, particularly the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) and its TRIPS agreement. It argues that the current 
global trade regime upholds existing inequalities and further entrenches poverty in the 
Third World, while benefiting multinational companies and many people in more affluent 
states. The chapter explores the consequences of this for displacement and migration 
patterns. Chapter six looks at how military interventions create displacement, through 
actual military action as well as post-conflict statebuilding by international actors that 
transform the state from within.  
 
The final chapter looks at environmental reasons for displacement such as climate change 
and other types of environmental degradation, and discusses how the few states carrying 
the largest responsibility for such problems are nevertheless not taking responsibility for 
adequately assisting those displaced as a consequence. My main thesis through all 
chapters is to show how the corresponding international law regimes in each of these 
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fields help those that contribute greatly to displacement globally to cloud, obfuscate, or 
deny their responsibility.  
 
 
A. Methodology 
 
To demonstrate that displacement has international causes, rather than primarily local 
ones, I rely on scholars that fall broadly within critical approaches to international law. 
This is because I hold that international law holds a bias towards the interests of the states 
that are politically and economically the most affluent, the developed states, and as such 
the mainstream international legal narrative tends to be shaped by such a standpoint. As 
such, in order to understand how the affluent states themselves through law are 
perpetuating suffering in the Third World, and consequently displacement, there is a need 
to deconstruct and suggest an alternative view to the mainstream narrative that argues 
that affluent states offer the solution rather than being part of the problem.  
 
Therefore, I intend to rely on scholars broadly within the category of critical approaches 
that focus on issues of responsibility, such as Anne Orford; as well as BS Chimni, a 
renowned scholar of Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) as well as 
Marxist approaches, that has worked on refugee law. Anthony Anghie is also a TWAIL 
scholar who is useful in order to understand the way powerful states and institutions have 
formed international law. Other critical theorists outside of the field of law, such as 
Thomas Pogge and David Chandler also serve as helpful complements.  
 
While I do not intend to idealize the local sphere and hold that the international sphere is 
solely responsible for displacement and suffering in the Third World, I do argue that the 
latter must be subject to greater scrutiny in order to understand appropriately the 
dynamics of displacement. Most guidelines and policies related to IRL suggest only local 
remedies and solutions to local problems, rarely questioning how this focus on the local 
and away from the international is enabled through international law. The number of 
displaced people is growing, pointing to a serious mismatch between current international 
law solutions for displacement and the causes of displacement. External factors are 
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hidden from view, particularly due to the way international law is structured, serving the 
interests of the powerful. Critical legal scholarship calls for a more nuanced approach to 
international law, which takes into consideration power relations between the actors 
international law is made by and for. As the purpose of this thesis is to examine 
international responsibility for displacement and the role of international law in shaping 
such responsibility, scholars taking a critical approach to international law provide 
helpful methods and insights into the relevant power dynamics and how these dynamics 
relate to international law.   
 
 
B. Terminology 
 
There is a range of terms used while discussing people who move, often depending on a 
degree of voluntariness and the motivation behind the decision to migrate. A refugee is, 
according to widespread usage in the media and by the layperson, someone who has fled 
his or her home due to a variety of reasons such as conflict, war, persecution, human 
rights violations, poverty, famine, or environmental degradation.  
 
In contrast to the widespread usage, the legal criteria for defining a refugee depart from 
the common usage of the term in a number of ways, where the 1951 Convention Related 
to the Status of Refugees (hereinafter the 1951 Refugee Convention) and its 1967 
Protocol protects only those fleeing from specific types of civil and political rights 
violations that relate to discrimination, and excludes reasons related to socio-economic 
rights.3 In addition, it only includes people having crossed an international border.4 This 
reduces the number of refugees legally defined as such by the 1951 Refugee Convention 
                                                          
3 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1 A(2), entered into force April 22, 1954, 189 U.N.T.S. 
150. Article 1 A(2) stipulates that the term refugee applies to anyone who “As a result of events occurring 
before 1 January 1951 and owing to wellfounded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that 
country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a 
result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it”. 
4 B.S. Chimni, Who is a refugee?, in INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW. A READER., 4 (B.S. Chimni ed., 8 ed. 
2012). 
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to only a very small proportion of those forcibly displaced as encompassed by the term’s 
ordinary usage.  
 
Asylum seekers are people seeking to be granted refugee status according to international 
and national legal instruments. Internally displaced people are usually defined as people 
forced to leave their habitual residence due to factors such as violence and armed 
conflicts, but remaining within their state of origin.5 The more general term forced 
migration focuses mainly on an element of coercion, and often includes people fleeing 
persecution, conflict, general violence, violations of human rights, famine, drought, as 
well as environmental change and natural disasters. It refers to both those crossing 
international borders as well as people remaining in their state of origin.6  
 
On the other hand, people who migrate for reasons not mentioned above are commonly 
considered to move voluntarily, and are usually referred to as economic migrants or 
migrant workers.7 This latter group is commonly understood as a separate group less 
deserving of protection and without the right to remain in another country. In actual fact, 
under international law, only those who fall under the narrow legal definition of refugee 
have the right to remain in another country.  
 
All other categories of migrants – whether forced or voluntary – can only remain at the 
discretion of the host state. Regional legal regimes in Africa and Central America have 
attempted to ameliorate this problem by extending regional law to encompass other types 
of forced migration such as mass violations of human rights, war, and natural disasters. 
However, these regimes have limited geographical applicability.  
 
                                                          
5 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION (IOM), INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW: GLOSSARY ON 
MIGRATION 8, 32–33 (2004). 
6 UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR), MID-YEAR TRENDS 3 (2015), 
http://www.unhcr.org/56701b969.html (last visited Feb 26, 2016); What is forced migration?, FORCED 
MIGRATION ONLINE, http://www.forcedmigration.org/about/whatisfm (last visited Feb 26, 2016); 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION (IOM), supra note 5 at 25; Asylum and Migration, 
UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a1d406060.html (last visited Apr 1, 2016). 
7 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION (IOM), supra note 5 at 20, 41. 
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In this thesis, I attempt to problematize the common categorizations of migrants, and 
especially the notion of voluntariness. In addition, I hold that the proliferation of 
categories enables the creation of a hierarchy deciding who is the most deserving of 
protection and assistance and as such permits a disavowal of responsibility. States that are 
involved in displacing people, as will be argued in this thesis, have a wide discretion of 
who can enter and stay within their borders. In that way, such categories become part of 
the problem rather than the solution.  
 
Many factors are involved in the decision to migrate, and it is difficult to draw the line 
between what is voluntary and not. As an example, it is questionable whether people 
migrating due to economic needs have a real choice of staying behind. As such, I hold 
that most movements include a coercive element. As the purpose of the present thesis is 
to highlight injustices perpetrated by states of the Global North which leads to people 
moving, I use the term refugee in its broader popular meaning of someone who is forced 
to move, rather than its strict legal meaning. I use the terms displaced and displacement 
to encompass both refugees as well as migrants. As the aforementioned categories are 
well-established, and are part and parcel of the legal regimes I critique, it will be 
impossible not to refer to them, especially when referring to data, numbers, research, and 
specific policies. This illustrates how internalized and entrenched such categories are in 
existing analyses about population movement. 
 
 
 
II. Displacement: A Global Concern 
 
Displaced people are mostly fleeing persecution, conflict, general violence, violations of 
human rights, famine, drought, as well as other types of environmental change and 
natural disasters, which thus form the main causes of displacement around the world.8  
According to Forced Migration Online, displacement has increasingly become a strategic 
tactic often used by all sides in the conflict and as such there has been a large increase in 
the number of refugees.9 In addition, the deterioration of the situation in countries where 
refugees were residing is contributing to force more people to move onwards,10 including 
economic reasons.   
 
Displacement is and has been one of the largest humanitarian issues over the last century, 
with over 55 million people currently of concern to the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the number continuously increasing. 
Although the IRL principle of responsibility (burden)-sharing advocates for solidarity 
between states, countries in the Third World are carrying most of the responsibility for 
hosting refugees. Northern states prefer to participate in (mostly inadequate) funding to 
UNHCR, refugee-hosting states, and countries of origin.  
 
A number of measures to deal with displacement have been implemented on both 
regional and global levels. This involves measures offering protection to refugees, such 
as asylum and resettlement; as well as measures for countries to mitigate the effects on 
their own local societies, including the use of a restrictive definition of the term refugee 
as well as other justifications for why refugees ought to or must turn elsewhere. Aid and 
cooperation with refugee-hosting states has in this regard received a prominent role.11 
This thesis questions whether such measures can realistically create durable solutions for 
displacement. As will be highlighted, this is because the current solutions are developed 
                                                          
8 UNHCR, supra note 6 at 3; What is forced migration?, supra note 6; Asylum and Migration, supra note 6. 
9 What is forced migration?, supra note 6. 
10 UNHCR, SO CLOSE: YET SO FAR FROM SAFETY (2014), http://www.unhcr.org/54ad53b69.pdf (last visited 
Apr 1, 2016). 
11 See chapter three subsection C.  
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in a context where refugee law and scholarship rarely tackles the root causes of 
displacement, and when it does, avoids considering other factors than those pertaining to 
the internal issues in countries of displacement themselves.   
 
While displacement has been an issue for decades, the number of displaced people is on 
the rise. According to the UNHCR, as of January 2015, almost 55 million persons were 
of concern to the organization. Of these, over 14 million were considered refugees, 
almost 1.8 million were asylum-seekers, and 32 million IDPs, with the remaining falling 
into other displacement categories.12 UNHCR estimates that the actual number has 
surpassed 60 million.13 According to population data from this period, this amounts to 
around 0.8 percent of the world’s population.14  
 
While considering only refugees, UNHCR claims that “[t]he total number of refugees has 
increased significantly and consistently over the past four years,” from 10.4 million at the 
end of 2011 to reaching 15.1 million by mid-2015, the highest in 20 years. The main 
reason behind the recent surge is the war in Syria, however conflicts in other countries 
like Afghanistan, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, Somalia, South 
Sudan, and Ukraine have contributed considerably as well.15 In addition, the number of 
people being able to return to their country of origin is going down, and as such many 
refugees and displaced will reside outside of their country of origin for many years. 
UNHCR shows that sub-Saharan Africa hosts the largest number of refugees (4.1 
million), while Asia, Europe and the MENA region host 3.8, 3.5 and 3 million 
respectively.16  
 
                                                          
12 UNHCR, UNHCR GLOBAL APPEAL 2016-2017 (2015), http://www.unhcr.org/564da0e3b.html (last 
visited Jan 4, 2016). 
13 UNHCR, supra note 6 at 4–6. 
14 Population of the entire world, yearly, 1950-2100, GEOHIVE, 
http://www.geohive.com/earth/his_history3.aspx (last visited Apr 1, 2016). 
15 UNHCR, supra note 6 at 4–6. Regarding country of origin, Syria is currently the largest source country 
of refugees. It was followed by Afghanistan (around 2.6 million), Somalia (1.1. million). Other refugee 
producing countries are South Sudan, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African 
Republic, Myanmar, Eritrea and Iraq, in this order. 
16 Id. at 3. 
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Another salient feature mentioned by UNHCR is that half of the top 10 refugee-hosting 
countries are sub-Saharan African.17 Except for Turkey, which is the country hosting the 
largest number of refugees in 2015 (due to the Syrian conflict), the other 10 countries on 
the list are developing countries.18 Although recent numbers have been increasing, 
displacement is not a new phenomenon, and numbers have been high for decades.19  
 
In terms of asylum-seekers, almost a million individual asylum applications were 
registered worldwide in the first half of 2015, which was almost double the number in 
mid-2014.20 In general, the yearly number is around a million.21 In addition to this, 
UNHCR reports that an estimated 34 million IDPs were currently assisted by UNHCR by 
mid-2015, the greatest numbers being within Syria, Colombia, Iraq, Sudan, Pakistan, 
South Sudan, DRC, Nigeria and Ukraine.22 
 
Compared to the numbers of refugees and asylum seekers world-wide, Europe is hosting 
a much lower number. According to Eurostat, there were just below 300,000 asylum-
seekers lodging their applications in the EU in 2004, just below 200,000 in 2006, back to 
300,000 again in 2011, after which it started rising considerably, and reached over 
600,000 in 2014.23 The 2014 number was the highest number of asylum applicants in the 
                                                          
17 Id. at 6. 
18 Id. at 6–7. By mid-year 2015, the list includes Pakistan (1.5 million), Lebanon (1.2 million), Iran 
(982,000), Ethiopia (702,500), Jordan (664,100), Kenya (552,300), Uganda (428,400), Chad (420,800) and 
Sudan (356,200). These numbers are of refugees under UNHCR mandate and as such is underestimated. 
19 UNHCR, POPULATIONS OF CONCERN TO UNHCR: A STATISTICAL OVERVIEW 1–71 13 (1994), 
http://www.unhcr.org/3bfa33154.html The report states that over 27 million persons were of concern to 
UNHCR in 1994; Population of the entire world, yearly, 1950-2100, supra note 14 According to population 
numbers at this website, the 1994 number of refugees amounted to around 0.48 percent of the world’s 
population. 
20 UNHCR, supra note 6 at 9. 
21 Asylum-Seekers, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c137.html (last visited Apr 1, 2016). 
22 UNHCR, supra note 6 at 14. 
23 Eurostat, FILE:ASYLUM APPLICATIONS (NON-EU) IN THE EU-28 MEMBER STATES, 2004–14, 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:Asylum_applications_(non-EU)_in_the_EU-
28_Member_States,_2004%E2%80%9314_(%C2%B9)_(thousands)_YB15_III.png (last visited Feb 27, 
2016). 
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EU since the peak in 1992.24 As a comparison, only 27% of the first instance decisions 
were positive in the EU 2008, 25% in 2011, although 45% in 2014.25  
 
Refugees and asylum-seekers are increasingly finding their way across the 
Mediterranean, as other routes are closed to them. Many lose their lives on their way. The 
main migration routes across the Mediterranean to Europe are from North Africa and 
Turkey. The principal North African points of departure are Tunisia and Libya, directed 
towards Italian islands and Malta. People passing over Turkish territory attempt to reach 
Greece by boat, and previously through the land border. Others attempt to cross the 
border to Bulgaria.26 In 2014, 165,000 refugees and migrants arrived in Europe through 
these routes, compared to 60,000 in 2013. Although the people crossing the 
Mediterranean in 2014 came from over 40 different countries, almost half of them were 
from Syria and Eritrea. According to UNHCR, forced displacement was at the centre of 
sea arrivals, with a large number “fleeing from war, violence and persecution.”27 
 
 
                                                          
24 Asylum statistics - Statistics Explained, EUROSTAT, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics (last visited Feb 27, 2016). 
25 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, ASYLUM IN THE EU: FACTS AND FIGURES (2015), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/551332/EPRS_BRI%282015%29551332_EN.p
df (last visited Feb 27, 2016). 
26 FRONTEX, FRAN QUARTERLY 9 (2015), 
http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/FRAN_Q1_2015.pdf (last visited Apr 1, 2016); 
EUROMED, EUROMED MIGRATION III PROJECT: THE MANAGEMENT OF MIXED MIGRATION FLOWS IN 
THE LAST DECADE: LESSONS LEARNT AND OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 15 5–9 (2007), 
http://www.unhcrwashington.org/sites/default/files/UAC_4_Refugee%20Protection%20and%20Mixed%20
Migration%2010%20Point%20Plan_February%202011_English.pdf (last visited Apr 1, 2016). 
27 UNHCR, supra note 10. 
 
 
III. International Refugee Law: Burden Shifting and Apartheid 
 
International refugee law (IRL) is the main international legal framework that can 
provide admission and stay for aliens in another country. All European states are parties 
to the 1951 Refugee Convention and thus rely on IRL when developing their own 
national and regional policies with regards to asylum and admission. In this chapter I 
argue that that IRL is only protecting a small group of displaced people. This is firstly 
due to its restrictive legal definition of the term refugee. Secondly, it has evolved into a 
regime that favours the containment of displaced within the Third World. Thirdly, 
European states are implementing a vast number of measures ensuring that most 
displaced people never enter European jurisdiction and thus will not have the opportunity 
to claim asylum. Thus, European states can claim that they are upholding principles of 
human rights and IRL while in actual fact granting asylum only to a minimal number of 
needy people.  
 
In this chapter I will start with outlining the main features of IRL and how the protection 
regime favours containment of displaced in the Third World. This will be illustrated by 
examining European asylum policies, which I hold are excluding, rather than protecting, 
the displaced. Finally, I discuss the legal principles of burden-sharing and cooperation 
between states and conclude that currently Third World states and people are carrying the 
largest part of the burden.  
 
 
A. Legal Overview of Refugee Definition and Granting of Asylum 
 
Among the most crucial part of IRL is the definition of the term refugee, which is of 
utmost importance in order to understand what refugee law can and cannot legally 
provide for people who have been forced to leave their homes. This definition can be 
found in refugee law’s main legal instruments: the 1951 Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees28 and its 1967 Protocol.29 The Convention provides the most widely 
                                                          
28 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Supra note 3.  
29 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, entered into force October 4, 1967.  
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accepted legal definition of a refugee, and incorporates the important concept of non-
refoulement, in addition to providing minimum standards of treatment of refugees.30  
 
The legal criteria for defining a refugee depart from the common usage of the term in a 
number of ways. According to widespread usage in the media and by the layperson, a 
refugee is someone who has fled his or her home due to a variety of reasons like conflict, 
war, persecution, human rights violations, poverty, famine or environmental degradation. 
In contrast to this, the legal definition as per the 1951 Refugee Convention stipulates that 
a refugee is someone who “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is 
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country.”31 As such, the 1951 Refugee Convention 
protects only those fleeing from specific types of civil and political rights violations that 
occur in the context of discrimination, and excludes reasons related to socio-economic 
rights as well as civil and political rights’ violations unrelated to a discrimination 
context.32  
 
The 1951 Refugee Convention is only concerned with refugees from Europe fleeing 
events occurring before 1951. The 1967 Additional Protocol removes this geographic and 
temporal limitation, however the term refugee has not been reconsidered, which has led 
to most Third World refugees being excluded, as they frequently flee due to conflict, 
natural disasters, as well as political and economic turmoil, rather than being fleeing 
discrimination-based persecution as understood in the European experience of the 
                                                          
30 B.S. CHIMNI, INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW. A READER. xii (B.S. Chimni ed., 8 ed. 2012). There are 
also various regional conventions, declarations and other instruments as well, like the CONVENTION 
GOVERNING THE SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF REFUGEE PROBLEMS IN AFRICA (OAU CONVENTION), 1001 U.N.T.S. 
45 (1969), http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36018.html (last visited Nov 26, 2015).1969 OAU 
Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, the Cartagena Declaration on 
Refugees, various European instruments including the Dublin Convention, and the Statute of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees adopted by the General Assembly in December 1950. However, 
for the purpose of this thesis only the 1951 Refugee Convention as well as its 1967 Protocol will be 
considered, as they are what is applicable in Europe, in addition to being the most widely used on an 
international level.  
31 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Supra note 3, art. 1A(2).  
32 B.S. Chimni, supra note 4 at 4. 
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holocaust during the Second World War, which was an experience that profoundly 
shaped the writing of the 1951 Refugee Convention.33  
 
Although the Convention was intended as a response to victims of war, it grants refugee 
status only to those who have a well-founded fear of persecution for “reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion,”34 
which means that they must be “subject to differential victimization.”35 As such, most 
people in the world leaving their homes due to human rights violations or general 
violence do not qualify as refugees in the legal sense.36 As mentioned in the introduction, 
the purpose of the present thesis is to highlight injustices perpetrated by states of the 
Global North that contribute to displacement. Thus, I will consider refugees in the 
general sense of the word, as the exclusionary nature of the legal definition plays a part in 
hampering the possibilities to examine the causes of displacement.  
 
Although the 1951 Refugee Convention has such a narrow definition, article 33 of the 
1951 Refugee Convention states that “no Contracting State shall expel or return 
(‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his 
life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”37 Consequently, although 
states can hold that an asylum seeker does not fit the definition of a refugee based on the 
criterion of being particularly targeted, the non-refoulement principle is of a wider 
application. As such, a person not defined as a refugee shall in the mentioned 
circumstances still not be sent back, although they need not be granted refugee status or 
the benefits provided for refugees under the Convention. Often in these situations states 
will grant the person protected by non-refoulement some other type of humanitarian 
status or send them to a third state. 
 
 
                                                          
33 Id. at 7–8. 
34 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Supra note 3, art. 1A(2). 
35 JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS. 185 (1991). 
36 Id. at 124. 
37 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Supra note 3, art. 33(1). 
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B. Non-Entré Policies towards Refugees from the Third World 
 
The refugee regime has undergone changes since the 1951 Refugee Convention was 
adopted, due to changing political circumstances and the appearance of a new type of 
asylum seekers. For example, the narrow refugee definition relates to the historical and 
political context. The convention was drafted with the backdrop of the Cold War, where 
political dissenters from Soviet states and its allies served as a political purpose for the 
western states, and were thus offered asylum.38 However, especially after the Cold War, 
refugees no longer had an ideological value and a majority were arriving from Third 
World states, which added to the growing idea that people were economic migrants 
aiming for better opportunities rather than refugees.   
 
It was also held that Third World refugees were displaced due to internal rather than 
international conflicts, for which the post-colonial state was solely responsible. Finally, 
some argued that the number of the new asylum seekers were too large, and as such it 
was expected that states closer to the origin of displacement would host them while being 
granted financial assistance from western states.39  Thus the refugee law regime evolved 
into a non-entrée regime that excludes most displaced people.40 
 
Due to the resulting policies we can observe that, in 1991, Sudan alone was hosting more 
refugees than Western Europe and North America together.41 In terms of more recent 
accounts, the number of refugees in the US, Canada as well as Western, Central, and 
Southern Europe in 2015, was according to the UNHCR just below two million, while in 
Sudan and South Sudan alone this number was 4.8 million.42 In terms of asylum, the 
                                                          
38 JAMES C. HATHAWAY, supra note 35 at 6. 
39 James C. Hathaway, A reconsideration of the underlying premise of refugee law, 31 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
129–147 (1990); B.S. Chimni, The geopolitics of refugee studies: a view from the South, 11 JOURNAL OF 
REFUGEE STUDIES 25, 352–357 (1998). 
40 James C. Hathaway, supra note 39. 
41 B.S. Chimni, supra note 39 at 359. 
42 2015 UNHCR country operations profile - Sudan, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e483b76.html 
(last visited Apr 16, 2016); 2015 UNHCR country operations profile - South Sudan, UNHCR, 
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4e43cb466.html (last visited Apr 16, 2016) The statistics for Sudan and South 
Sudan are including refugees, IDPs, stateless persons and asylum seekers; 2015 UNHCR subregional 
operations profile - North America and the Caribbean, Canada, UNHCR, 
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e491336.html (last visited Apr 16, 2016); 2015 UNHCR subregional 
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number of refugees of concern to UNHCR in mid-2014 reached 13 million,43 while 
around 600,000 applied for asylum in Europe in 2014,44 and only around 71,000 were 
resettled the year before,45 thus leaving most refugees in less than adequate situations in 
the Third World.  
 
To cope with the large numbers of displaced persons that do not fall under the 
Convention, UNHCR is continuously expanding its mandate, and is increasingly turning 
into a humanitarian organization, focusing on preventive protection, internally displaced 
persons, returnees and humanitarian relief activities.46 This has to do with the fact that 
UNHCR is reliant on the financial support of its donors (powerful Western states), and is 
obliged to serve these interests. Thus, UNHCR has had a prominent role in enabling the 
shift in refugee law in the post-Cold War era, promoting concepts of protection in the 
Third World, safety zones, and temporary protection.47   
 
Another reason for the prominence of local solutions in the Third World, has to do with 
the fact that states of the Global North have exercised high influence over the knowledge 
production about displacement and asylum. This has been led by academic institutions in 
the Global North, which have manly focused on local explanations for displacement, 
while ignoring external causes like trade and economic policies. According to this view, 
conflicts occur due to cultural, economic and political factors internal to these countries. 
Thus, it may seem natural that displacement is considered to be best mitigated by firstly, 
protecting those fleeing their homes, and secondly, providing assistance to countries of 
transit and origin. As such, addressing other issues like global inequality has been left to 
                                                          
operations profile - North America and the Caribbean, United States of America, UNHCR, 
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e492086.html (last visited Apr 16, 2016); 2015 UNHCR subregional 
operations profile - Northern, Western, Central and Southern Europe, UNHCR, 
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e45bb01.html (last visited Apr 16, 2016). 
43 UNHCR - Figures at a Glance, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c11.html (last visited Nov 
25, 2015). 
44 Eurostat, supra note 23. 
45 UNHCR, UNHCR GLOBAL RESETTLEMENT STATISTICAL REPORT 2013 11 (2013), 
http://www.unhcr.org/52693bd09.html (last visited Nov 25, 2015). 
46 B. S. Chimni, Globalization, humanitarianism and the erosion of refugee protection, 13 J. REFUGEE 
STUD. 243–263, 256–257 (2000). 
47 See B.S. Chimni, supra note 39 at 366–368. 
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scholars outside of IRL to deal with, as the two realms’ interconnectedness is 
obfuscated.48  
 
As the Refugee Convention is applied by member states, international oversight is 
minimal, and as such in practice states have a lot of leeway in interpreting how the 
Convention is applied.49 This, coupled with the vast exclusionary measures ensuring that 
displaced people rarely arrive in any Western state, ensures that Western states are 
allowed “to maintain the façade of universal, humane concern without the necessity of 
affording genuine protection.”50 The failure to acknowledge such contradictions makes it 
possible to avoid discussing responsibility and adequate solutions.51 The following 
section will illustrate the previously mentioned points through examining the main 
elements of European asylum policies.  
 
 
C. European Policies on Admission of Refugees and Asylum Seekers 
 
European states have created a wide range of measures intended to keep asylum seekers 
from reaching European territory or to ensure that they promptly return, which is the 
main reason behind EU migration policies.52 By keeping most displaced people away 
from European jurisdictions, they are able to avoid examining asylum claims, evade the 
need to deport unsuccessful asylum seekers, and escape non-refoulement obligations. 
This includes enhanced sea-patrolling and border control, restricting visa procedures, 
requiring airlines to check visas before boarding,53 as well as bilateral agreement with 
countries bordering Europe. Other measures to ensure refugees do not reach Europe 
                                                          
48 See Veit Bader, The ethics of immigration, 12 CONSTELLATIONS, 337–353 (2005); See MATTHEW J. 
GIBNEY, THE ETHICS AND POLITICS OF ASYLUM: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND THE RESPONSE TO REFUGEES 
(2004). These authors also point to the need to look at the co-responsibility of other states through 
entrenching global inequality and poverty, while discussing the ethics of asylum and borders.  
49 James C. Hathaway, supra note 39. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Martin Baldwin-Edwards, “Between a rock & a hard place”: North Africa as a region of emigration, 
immigration & transit migration, 33 REV. AFR. POL. ECONOMY 311–324 (2006). 
53 CLAIRE RODIER, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, ANALYSIS OF THE EXTERNAL DIMENSION OF THE EU’S 
ASYLUM AND IMMIGRATION POLICIES - SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT 11 (2006). 
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include aid to UNHCR, to non-European countries hosting refugees, as well as to 
countries where displacement occurs. As such, only a small percentage of refugees reach 
Europe, while most are hosted in less than adequate conditions in the Third World, 
placing a large burden on already poor states. Despite all this, the international legal 
system allows Europe to claim that it is committed to protecting refugees.54  
 
1. A Security Language  
 
The exclusionary policies by Northern states are partly enabled through framing the 
refugee issue in a security language, where refugees pose a security threat to the host 
states and societies55 rather than a victim in need for protection. As a consequence, 
Baldwin-Edwards argues that recently the EU has placed a remarkable emphasis on 
security aspects of migration, like for example controlling borders, detaining and 
expelling illegal migrants.56  
 
In light of an enhanced focus on security at the expense of human rights, a number of 
agreements have been entered with neighbouring states, among them the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), Mobility Partnerships, as well as other bilateral 
agreements between EU member states and non-EU states. Through such agreements, the 
EU is partially leaving the management of its borders and asylum processing to partner 
states.57 These partnerships ensure a joint border management system outside of the EU 
which includes immigration and asylum policy as an important feature,58 among them 
visa policies, enhanced sea and land border patrolling, exchange of information and 
training of officials involved in border management,59 with the aim to prevent 
undocumented migrants from reaching Europe. It has been held that these methods often 
                                                          
54 James C. Hathaway, supra note 39; See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, EUROPEAN UNION. MANAGING 
MIGRATION MEANS POTENTIAL EU COMPLICITY IN NEIGHBORING STATES’ ABUSE OF MIGRANTS AND 
REFUGEES (2006); Baldwin-Edwards, supra note 52; CLAIRE RODIER, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, supra 
note 53. 
55 See CLAIRE RODIER, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, supra note 53 at 14. 
56 Baldwin-Edwards, supra note 52 at 312. 
57 CLAIRE RODIER, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, supra note 53 at 8. 
58 Id. at 9. 
59 Id. at 10.; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ABUSED AND EXPELLED: ILL-TREATMENT OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN 
MIGRANTS IN MOROCCO 55–56 (2014). 
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result in asylum-seekers and refugees being denied international protection.60 Frontex,61 
the European agency which manages the border control was established in 2004 and has 
carried out various maritime joint operations in the Mediterranean, particularly due to 
pressure from southern European states.62  
 
Readmission agreements form an important feature in the EU migration policies, often 
made possible through negotiating other issues such as economic assistance or 
development aid.63 These ensure that that states parties to such agreements agree to 
accept back their nationals and often third country nationals who passed through the 
territory of this country before reaching Europe.64  This allows the EU member state to 
expel third country nationals that cannot be sent back to their country of origin due to the 
principle of non-refoulement. As the signatory state is often considered a so-called ‘safe 
third state’, it is assumed that sending people to this country enables the EU member state 
to observe the non-refoulement principle. But the often inadequate asylum and human 
rights standards of the readmitting country has led to many questioning whether these 
third states are really safe.65 It has also been shown that states often return people without 
giving them the opportunity to claim asylum, raising concerns about indirect refoulement 
if the third state may not provide a durable solution either.66  
 
In addition to these policies, the EU has realized that restricting access may not prove 
good results, and as such there have been proposals to invest in “job creation, economic 
growth and poverty alleviation schemes in Africa in order to stem the tide of irregular 
emigration and/or stimulate development”.67  
 
                                                          
60 CLAIRE RODIER, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, supra note 53 at 12. 
61 Frontex means European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External 
Borders of the Member States of the European Union. 
62 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 59 at 54. 
63 Id. at 54–56. 
64 CLAIRE RODIER, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, supra note 53 at 16. 
65 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 54 at 4; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 59 at 55; ELISA 
FORNALÉ, PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS OF IRREGULAR MIGRANTS 177 (2013). 
66 Baldwin-Edwards, supra note 52; See also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 59 at 56–59. 
67 Aderanti Adepoju, Femke Van Noorloos & Annelies Zoomers, Europe’s Migration Agreements with 
Migrant-Sending Countries in the Global South: A Critical Review: Europe’s migration agreements, 48 
INT’L. MIGR. 42–75, 42, 68 (2009). 
20 
 
2. Asylum 
 
Based on the 1951 Refugee Convention, the EU states have established a Common 
European Asylum System, which is aimed at harmonizing common minimum legal 
standards in all member states, in addition to ensuring practical cooperation and solidarity 
among the states.68 According to the European Union, its asylum system aims to form a 
“joint approach to guarantee high standards of protection for refugees.”69 However, in 
light of the previous paragraphs about border patrols, readmission agreements and visa 
restrictions, it becomes clear that this only counts for a small group of refugees and 
asylum-seekers and not all those actually attempting to reach the continent.  
 
3. Resettlement  
 
Since most refugees are unable to return to their country of origin, another durable 
solution to their situation is resettlement in a third country, an option provided to a small 
number of recognized refugees. The idea behind this solution is that an expanded option 
for organized resettlement would reduce the need for refugees to irregularly undertake 
secondary movements.70 Although resettlement is provided as a durable solution in the 
UNHCR statute, less than one percent of the 15 million refugees UNHCR knows of are 
submitted for resettlement. Only a small number of states are taking part in the 
resettlement programme on a voluntary basis,71 around 25 developed countries.72 In 2011, 
the EU resettled a bit over 4,000 refugees which amounted to only 7 percent of the total 
resettled,73 and much less when considering the word’s refugee population.  
 
 
                                                          
68 DGs - Migration and Home Affairs - What we do - Policies - Asylum, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-
affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/index_en.htm (last visited Feb 28, 2016). 
69 Id. 
70 Stephen H. Legomsky, Secondary refugee movements and the return of asylum seekers to third 
countries: the meaning of effective protection, 15 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 567–677, 600–601 (2003). 
71 UNHCR - Resettlement, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a16b1676.html (last visited Feb 28, 2016). 
72 United Nations Global Issues - Refugees, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/en/globalissues/briefingpapers/refugees/overviewofforceddisplacement.html (last visited 
Apr 17, 2016). 
73 Resettlement, EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON REFUGEES AND EXILES, http://www.ecre.org/topics/areas-of-
work/resettlement.html (last visited Apr 2, 2016). 
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D. Burden-Sharing 
 
The change in the refugee protection regime as well as the range of measures taken by 
states of the Global North with the aim of impeding displaced from arriving renders 
protection under IRL meaningless, as this system enables states of the Global North to 
physically deny people in need of protection a genuine right to seek asylum while 
simultaneously claiming it respects international obligations. This contradicts the concept 
of burden-sharing, a central feature of IRL aimed at ensuring solidarity among states with 
regards to the burden of hosting displaced people.  
 
The concept is closely related to international cooperation and solidarity, and has been 
widely discussed by a number of scholars in addition to forming a continuous debate 
among states on how to address and resolve refugee situations, especially considering the 
uneven burden that is placed upon countries. The international refugee regime is 
dependent on cooperation between states, as displacement challenges are transnational 
and cannot be addressed by individual states alone.74 The burden-sharing principle 
mentioned in the preamble of the 1951 Refugee Convention,75 and Chimni argues that it 
is part of customary international law and thus legally binding.76  
 
Burden-sharing can take various forms, among them the provision of material, technical 
or financial assistance, in addition to resettlement of asylum-seekers and refugees. It may 
also include other provisions of durable solutions like temporary protection, local 
integration and voluntary repatriation.77 It can also mean sending troops to assist in 
                                                          
74 INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION TO SHARE BURDEN AND RESPONSIBILITIES:  EXPERT MEETING IN AMMAN, 
JORDAN, 27 AND 28 JUNE 2011, 1–2 (2011), http://www.unhcr.org/4df871e69.html (last visited Feb 27, 
2016) In addition, regional instruments governing refugee protection, among them the OAU Convention, 
the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, and European Union Instruments also refer to the need for 
international cooperation in this regard. 
75 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Supra note 3, Preamble.  
76 B. S. Chimni, Asylum, in INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW: A READER , 146 (B. S. Chimni ed., 2012). 
77 UNHCR, EXPERT MEETING ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION TO SHARE BURDENS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
7 (2011), http://www.refworld.org/docid/4e9fed232.html (last visited Feb 26, 2016). 
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stabilizing countries in conflict, humanitarian assistance as well as funds for 
statebuilding.78  
 
There are, however, no agreed parameters for how burden-sharing could be carried out in 
practice.79 Experts have placed emphasis on the fact that burden-sharing does not equal 
evading international obligations under international law, but should be complementary 
to states’ protection responsibilities. Therefore aid to states hosting refugees or for 
humanitarian purposes does not justify closure of borders.80 With a view to the outlines of 
European policies above, it is clear that European states are disregarding the fact that 
burden-sharing should only be a complement to existing international obligations. By 
closing borders with the justification that it provides external assistance, international 
obligations are evaded.81   
 
Given the unequal burden many refugee-hosting states are carrying, the issue of burden-
sharing has been heavily debated among refugee scholars, with solutions ranging from 
accepting the existing inequalities and respecting all interests, to suggestions of a 
complete change in the international refugee regime taking into account responsibilities 
for entrenchment of global structural inequalities.  
 
As an example of the first view, Hathaway and Neve realize the lack of will by states to 
host refugees, and attempt to take this into account and look for a pragmatic solution 
based on state interest. They propose a system of international burden-sharing where each 
state contributes according to its relative capacity, and participates in a system similar to 
that of an insurance scheme. This will allow the states to distribute the various financial 
and physical responsibilities to protect refugees among themselves, as long as the 
refugee’s risk to protection is not at stake.  
                                                          
78 Geoff Gilbert, Rights Legitimate Expectations, Needs and Responsibilities: UNHCR and the New World 
Order, 10 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 349–388, 363 (1998). 
79 INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION TO SHARE BURDEN AND RESPONSIBILITIES:  EXPERT MEETING IN AMMAN, 
JORDAN, 27 AND 28 JUNE 2011, supra note 74 at 2. 
80 UNHCR, supra note 77 at 2–4; Gilbert, supra note 78 at 363. 
81 See also VITIT MUNTARBHORN, REFUGEE PROBLEMS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: BETWEEN BURDEN 
SHARING AND BURDEN SHIFTING 4 (1990). 
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However, Hathaway’s solution can also create negative effects. Chimni criticizes this 
view and claims that Hathaway proposes “a solution which is far worse than the one he 
has critiqued.” He claims that Hathaway turns the refugee into a commodity to be traded 
among states, where already affluent states can take the structural inequalities among 
states to their advantage to pay themselves out of the refugee problem, thus creating a 
global apartheid. He, in turn, suggests that the refugee question not only originates from 
problems within the state where people are displaced, but also due to an unjust 
international system. Therefore, he advocates for a new approach that addresses global 
justice through the principles of solidarity, where the contribution of transnational 
capitalism, imperialism and those promoting it, and thus responsibility for displacement, 
are not ignored.82   
 
Although Hathaway might offer a pragmatic and potentially feasible solution given the 
unequal relationships of power between states on the international level, I argue in this 
thesis that a genuine solution to both the suffering by displaced people, in addition to the 
pressure on host states, must take into account the unjust international system. This is 
because root causes of displacement go deeper than its immediate, local causes like 
human rights abuse and conflict; the main issue is related to the continuous unjust global 
order upheld by a powerful group of states and institutions, which again relates to other 
international legal regimes. Without considering such a view, it may seem reasonable that 
other states have no obligation to take in those needing protection, and repatriation has 
become seen as the only solution to the problem.83 Therefore, taking into consideration 
both internal and external factors for displacement is key to understand appropriately its 
dynamics, and thus Chimni’s view is worthy of exploration.  
 
 
 
                                                          
82 See James C. Hathaway & R. Alexander Neve, Making international refugee law relevant again: a 
proposal for collectivized and solution-oriented protection, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. (1997); Chimni, supra 
note 46 at 250–251, 262–263. 
83 B.S. Chimni, supra note 39 at 361. 
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E. Conclusion 
 
The international community (i.e. affluent states) is still left to find a durable solution for 
the over 55 million refugees on a global level. With most of the world’s refugees out of 
sight, those with the most influence in IRL, scholarship and knowledge production can 
deal with the situation according to their own interests, while communities in the Third 
World take the heaviest toll, especially through severe measures in put place by the 
Global North ensuring that asylum-seekers never arrive in the North. The Global North, 
European states included, benefits from what scholars have called ‘global apartheid’, 
where Northern citizens can enjoy incredible benefits while a large majority of the 
world’s population is living in less than adequate conditions and with no legal recourse to 
even physically enter rich territories such as the European enclave.  
 
Although regions like for example the EU have started to realize that closing borders is 
not sufficient to stop refugee flows, most measures to mitigate this phenomenon are 
geared towards creating incentives for either countries of origin or transit to contain 
refugees there. This does not ensure an end to suffering, but keeps displaced out of sight 
in Europe, and as such, European states still do not admit any role in external causes of 
displacement. This has to do with the fact that refugee law and scholarship is 
disconnected from other legal regimes, and is as such unable to consider the root causes 
of displacement in a wider perspective of structural global inequalities and injustice. In 
this context, it seems difficult for the refugee field to find other, more durable solutions 
than those serving as a band-aid to people who have already become victims of 
displacement in addition to shifting the problem to other, less fortunate states to deal 
with.  
 
With this in mind, the aim of this thesis is to rectify this problem where I outline the way 
European states are implicated in creating conditions for displacement and what this 
means for European policies and the elaboration of genuine solutions to this issue. In 
order to do this, global inequality and international causes of displacement must be taken 
into account. As such, the following chapters will examine the main features of 
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international law and the main state actors that participate in institutionalizing suffering 
in the Third World, and thus carrying responsibility for displacement.  
 
 
IV. International Economic Law and Institutions: Intervention, Instability, and 
Displacement 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, international financial institutions (IFIs) have played an 
enhanced role in furthering neo-liberal economic policies as exemplified in the 
Washington Consensus, including promoting increased free trade, deregulation of the 
economy, and privatization.84 In this chapter I argue that economic policy is a part of 
global governance that has a tremendous effect on Third World countries, and plays an 
important role in entrenching poverty and creating conditions of instability. International 
institutions and the states influencing them portray these policies as technical solutions 
for people’s own benefit. Through playing on unequal power structures, institutions 
embed a narrative of local causes of conflict and displacement and remove any trace of 
external responsibility. As the primary motivator for international migration today is 
economic betterment, consequences like poverty and general instability are crucial in 
order to understand contemporary human mobility.  
 
This chapter will first outline the main laws and policies related to economic 
restructuring. Then, I will explain the rationale behind such policies and their 
consequences on Third World displacement dynamics. I will examine how international 
law has enabled these destabilizing endeavours through a narrative of good governance 
and human rights that localizes responsibilities and causes and hampers the ability to 
connect international economic laws and policies with displacement.  
 
 
A. Legal Overview of Structural Adjustment Programmes by IFIs 
 
International financial institutions (IFIs), like the World Bank (WB) and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) have wide impact in the global economy and governance, and are 
as such managing Third World states and their people. This is particularly as half of the 
world’s population is bound by their policies.85  
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The WB and the IMF were created in 1944 at the Bretton Woods Conference, which had 
its purpose of coordinating and managing international monetary and financial matters. 
While the WB places emphasis on promoting development and foreign investment, the 
IMF has a focus on monetary policy. Both provide loans to the Third World, which are 
subject to certain conditionalities which in turn, according to Anghie, “play an extremely 
important role in the formulation of Third World economic policies.”86 This is because 
the conditionalities require the receiving state to “to embark upon the radical 
restructuring of their economies through ‘structural adjustment programmes’,”87 in order 
to make use of the resources provided. Such reforms are often carried out with the 
support of liberals in the target state.88  
 
While restructuring programmes are designed for increased efficiency, expanding 
growth, and resilience to economic shocks, it is expected of the target countries that they 
alter their legal framework with regards to foreign investment and export-targeted 
production, government spending and privatization, liberalization of the economy, and 
devaluation. As such, requirements for change in legislation touch upon elements like the 
state budget, education and health policies, cutbacks in subsidies, social security and 
wage levels. Restructuring may also involve constitutional reform, including 
centralization policies.89    
 
 
B. Reasons for Conditionalities 
 
The WB and the IMF intervene through an invitation from the state involved, usually in 
order for this Third World state to take up a loan in order to overcome financial problems 
and to boost the economy. According to the IMF, its assistance “enables countries to 
rebuild their international reserves, stabilize their currencies, continue paying for imports, 
and restore conditions for strong economic growth, while undertaking policies to correct 
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underlying problems.”90 Particularly with regards to fragile states, it claims to be involved 
in order to assist in improved economic management and performance, as the factors 
behind state fragility are related to the lack of inclusiveness, underdevelopment, weak 
governance and institutions as well as conflict and instability.91 Similarly, it claims that 
conditionality is a tool which can help countries to solve payment issues without harming 
national or international prosperity, in addition to ensuring the ability of the state to repay 
the loan. Furthermore, it maintains that it assists countries to “protect the most vulnerable 
in a crisis.”92   
 
In this chapter, as will be explained below, I argue that this narrative is in contradiction 
with the fact that this alleged assistance has resulted in destabilizing these countries to the 
benefit of the states controlling them, where reforms like privatization and stripping the 
state of its main function is usually what affects the most vulnerable the hardest.  
 
 
C. Results of Conditionalities 
 
Although it is held that such conditionalities lead to the improvement of the receiving 
state’s economy, these elements are not entirely uncontroversial. A number of scholars 
also hold that they limit people’s self-determination, and through intervening excessively 
in the host state, these conditionalities have actually shown to lead to collapse in state 
institutions, entrenchment of poverty, which sometimes results in conflict and human 
rights abuses. In general, the people in the states affected are less able to influence their 
governments in a democratic way, as many decisions are made by international 
technocrats.  
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The aim in this thesis is not to argue that all IMF and WB activities are negative for the 
host state, as such an argument would ignore valuable technical and financial 
contributions provided. However, this thesis is mainly highlighting negative effects of 
international interventions that are otherwise usually out of view, and likewise their link 
to refugees and displacement. Thus, the following paragraphs will place emphasis on 
negative and less discussed links to these institutions and global inequality, which is 
crucial to understand displacement dynamics.   
 
1. Lack of Self-Determination 
 
Various critics, among them Orford and Anghie, hold that the extensive intervention by 
international financial institutions constrains these countries from formulating their own 
policies according to their own needs and interests. This limits the power of the people to 
influence their governments, which is rather exercised through IMF and WB officials. 
Thus, policies in many areas like health, labour, social security and education, as 
mentioned above, are dictated by international economists, rather than by local 
politicians, something that was once considered to be central to democratic governance. 
Consequently the right to self-determination and democratic governance is infringed 
upon, and these states do not have control over their own economy.93 Anne Orford argues 
that this contradicts the fact that the WB and IMF are committed to further 
democratization,94 as functions “go to the heart of political and constitutional authority.”95 
The inability for states to appropriately develop their own policies in crucial areas, makes 
the states vulnerable to influence by external institutions, states and corporations, driving 
policy changes in their favour at the expense of local needs. This could, as will be 
explained below, lead to social unrest and thus displacement.   
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2. Entrenchment of Poverty and Inequality 
 
Poverty and inequality has been further entrenched in these countries due to the neo-
liberal policies promoted by these organizations.96 Anghie argues that this is because such 
structural adjustment programmes have undermined important economic and social 
rights, and that some of these countries are actually worse off than before. This is because 
priority has been given to debt repayment rather than provision of basic welfare, where 
prices of basic commodities increase, public services are affected and unemployment 
increases.97 Other elements like cutting public expenditure, labour market deregulation, 
export-oriented production and privatization “have led to increased income disparity, 
human rights abuses, and marginalization of the poor and rural populations in many 
countries.”98  
 
The increase in poverty can be evidenced by the fact that during the same time as 
international financial institutions have proliferated, the world economy has grown 
twenty times, while inequality has increased. Pahuja suggests that “in regional terms, the 
ratio of per capita income of Europe to Africa in 1960 was 30:1. In 2005, it was 40:1.”99 
As such, the policies may have been good for some actors, but not for the poor as claimed 
by these institutions. Regardless of this, the World Bank argues that poverty has been 
significantly reduced.   
 
3. Conflict and Collapse in State Institutions – the Example of Yugoslavia 
 
As monetary intervention can have negative economic and social effects on many people 
in the target countries, this has sometimes developed into further destabilization of the 
society and the general security. Orford uses the example of the conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia and explains that although foreign institutions were not solely responsible for 
the genocide and conflict that played out in the early 1990s, they did have a decisive role. 
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Orford adds that Yugoslavia was part of a strict austerity programme during the 1970s 
and 1980s as a part of a debt restructuring by the IMF. The following economic policies, 
which were carried out through decisions by IMF and economic liberals in the Yugoslav 
government, were designed to refinance and repay Yugoslavia’s debt, which 
consequently affected constitutional reforms and worker’s rights during the 1980s.100 By 
the end of the 1990s, the war in the former Yugoslavia had displaced nearly 1,8 million 
people.101  
 
The structural adjustment programme in Yugoslavia involved similar elements as 
mentioned above, among them cuts in government expenditures, removal of protections 
against unemployment, liberalization of trade and prices, as well as promotion of exports 
and centralized political and economic decision making. Political barriers to a market 
economy were completely removed. Although presented as technical solutions, Orford 
argues that they had political implications, and as such the IMF reshaped Yugoslav 
politics throughout the following decades, through requiring constitutional and 
institutional reform in order to give more loans.102  
 
The new policies in Yugoslavia contributed to the genocide through creating conditions 
for poverty, unemployment and destruction of important state functions that had kept the 
various ethnic groups together, which in turn led to raising nationalism and eventually 
threatened domestic peace. Orford shows that this was enabled through a number of 
factors. Firstly, inflation, falling incomes, serious unemployment, loss of food subsidies 
and rising prices on commodities like gasoline and food created a sense of instability, and 
caused mass demonstrations. Secondly, the removal of constitutional arrangements and 
minority rights guarantees, as well as centralization of decision making removed 
mechanisms for accommodating ethno-national differences. The result was increased 
nationalism and a widening gulf between rich and poor republics.103 Finally, people 
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started to look elsewhere for a sense of community and identity, and that in this vacuum, 
the ethnic nationalism re-emerged, where nationalist groups challenging the federal 
government were able to appeal to those suffering from the reforms. In the end, the 
political system started breaking down.104 As such, the genocide and the resulting 
displacement was a combination of international financial policies and local responses.105  
 
4. Human Rights Abuses as People Resist Reforms 
 
While global institutions and the governments that influence them have partly caused 
destabilization and conflict in various countries, the consequences have in other situations 
been less severe, but triggering human rights abuses. Susan Marks argues that 
governments with a need to undertake major unpopular reforms, have few options other 
than violently suppress the opposition that surges as a consequence. As such, global 
institutions have played an important part in causing human rights abuses. She refers to 
the examples of Argentina and Chile, where the international financial institutions 
imposed major economic restructuring schemes in the 1970s, which deepened the poverty 
of people and led to severe oppression and human rights abuses as the government 
attempted to control discontent.106 Human rights abuses are one of the main causes of 
displacement, which can also be observed in terms of the amounts of refugees fleeing 
Chile and Argentina in the period following the restructuring.107  
 
5. How Such Policies are Made Possible  
 
During the previous paragraphs it is clear that the actions of the WB and IMF are not 
only assisting Third World states to repay their debt and create economic growth, but 
they are rather creating conditions for instability, conflict and poverty, which in turn 
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induce displacement. However, if these are the consequences, why is it so that these 
institutions as well as the states controlling them are not held accountable? The 
explanation is related to a number of factors.  
 
Firstly, historical inequalities and power relations between states, lack of UN General 
Assembly supervision over the IFIs108 as well as their internal structure give these 
institutions the ability to enforce their vision onto the host states. Secondly, the 
localization of causes for conflicts, poverty and displacement ensure that external causes 
are hidden from view. Thirdly, the adoption of a narrative of human rights and good 
governance by the IFIs enforces the idea that these institutions are assisting with 
solutions while the local needs to change. I argue that such a narrative ensures that the 
link between structural adjustment and displacement is nowhere to be found.  
 
Third World states’ unequal opportunities in the international economic system can be 
traced back to colonialism, where they have been unable to adequately gain a better 
position after independence. Already disadvantaged by colonialism, after independence, 
as Third World countries entered into a debt crisis in the 1980s, they had no other option 
than resorting to assistance from the IFIs and accept their disadvantageous conditions.109    
 
Such disadvantage has been enabled through the fact that the WB and IMF are creations 
of Western states and are undemocratic.110 This is related to their particular voting 
systems, which is weighted on the financial contributions by the members.111 The WB has 
a similar decision-making system. Thus, developing countries, who constitute over 85% 
of the world’s population, are severely under-represented, and the major industrial 
powers hold the control.112  
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The initial disadvantageous economic position as well as the inability to affect the 
decision making in these institutions, enables, according to Pogge, affluent states to 
structure international economic laws and policies according to their benefit.113 This can 
be shown by looking at how the present asymmetrical rules allow affluent countries to 
have an increased share in the global economic growth.114 In addition, governments are in 
turn strongly influenced by private corporations through their business lobbies. As such, 
Helleiner claims that the bulk of the power in decision making in the global economy 
rests “with those countries, firms and organizations that are economically (and, it must be 
added, militarily) the strongest”, which is contradictory to the claim that both the weak 
and the strong are equal participants in the political processes.115  
 
Consequently, global economic governance will be biased in favour of the affluent 
countries which control IFIs and use the power in their own interest, and it could be 
questioned whether human development and the struggle against poverty will actually 
receive any real focus.116 Any change in these institutions or the global order in general, 
would likely require the affluent to give up some of their extensive privileges, and as 
such any reforms are blocked by these governments as they are protecting and advancing 
their own interests.117 In this context, it seems clear that European policies towards the 
displaced are not just inadequate in the face of global inequalities that drive 
displacement; but rather European migration and asylum policies may well be a 
conscious part of ensuring that systemic European privilege stays in place and is 
reinforced. 
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With such inequalities in mind, the international financial institutions and the affluent 
countries controlling them are able to justify their interventions through constructing a 
narrative claiming that local problems are the reasons for the misery in the Third World 
and unable to govern themselves, while the international community is offering 
assistance to rectify this and avoid global economic crises.  
 
According to Anghie and Pahuja, rather than considering external factors, the narrative 
mostly localizes causes of poverty in the Third World, and points to poor political and 
institutional culture with corrupt elites, oppressive governments, as well as with an 
absence of formal laws and institutions, which in turn limits opportunities for investors.118 
International historic and continuing reasons for underdevelopment are hidden from 
sight, and consequently international causes are not addressed through international law 
regimes but rather are reinforced.119 This can be noticed by the fact that the IMF and 
particularly the WB, claim that they are furthering good governance, human rights and a 
better global economic policy.120  
 
Critics such as Pahuja, Anghie, and Rajagopal hold that international institutions are 
including good governance and democracy in their programmes as a new way of 
governing the Third World, although in reality this is only a pretext to deradicalize, 
coopt, or channel into innocuous directions any Third World resistance to their policies 
and “contain the rebellion from the bottom.”121  This narrative of bad governance, 
corruption and human rights abuses as internal to the Third World state provides the 
moral and intellectual foundation to manage the Third World and their peoples,122 where 
they need dominance for their own good.123 The narrative allows IFIs to claim that they 
are promoting international human rights law rather than violating it.124  As such, it has 
proven difficult to assert human rights violations against rich states and international 
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financial institutions.125 After going through periods of conditionality and structural 
adjustment, the ongoing failure of developing or attaining growth and prosperity is still 
blamed on a domestic failure to achieve good governance, not the interference of the 
international community.126  
 
 
D. Conclusion  
 
Considering the large displacement of people within and from the Third World, it is clear 
from this chapter that not only local causes can be blamed, although these are the 
frequent objects of national and international policy. It is important not to ignore local 
factors such as corruption, human rights abuses, quests for power and inequality. 
However, it is necessary to consider that the international community, including affluent 
European states, through the international financial institutions that they control, are able 
to intervene deeply into the political, economic and social structures of these Third World 
states and instrument vast changes in this regard. This is carried out under the banner of 
human rights, good governance and development, so desperately needed in these 
countries.  
 
However, history shows the disastrous results that such interventions can have for the 
most vulnerable in these countries, and it becomes clear that the IFIs alleged principles of 
human rights are rather a pretext in order to uphold the existing unequal global system, 
where the gap between rich and poor countries is only widening. This triggers reflections 
on the European policies on displacement and refugees mentioned in chapter three. If it is 
true that international institutions, with their European and other wealthy states as 
political drivers, are implicated in entrenching poverty and creating conditions for 
conflict and human rights abuses in the Third World, European asylum policies are 
neither sensible nor fair. With global inequality continuously growing, human rights 
abuses and conflicts are likely to continue, with mass displacement as one of its potential 
consequences. Migrants and asylum seekers will continue looking for a way across the 
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Mediterranean due to broad and systemic economic injustice but such considerations are 
rarely addressed, either in general international law scholarship or in refugee law 
scholarship, which indicated that affluent states are unwilling to give up their privileges.  
 
 
 
 
V. International Trade Law, Poverty and Population Movement 
 
As has been mentioned in other chapters, while refugees flee due to human rights abuses, 
instability and conflict, an important related factor for each of these issues is increasing 
inequality and entrenched poverty. Indeed, the main reason for contemporary human 
movement is seeking economic betterment. Thus, when considering international law’s 
role in contributing to displacement it is necessary to consider factors that entrench 
poverty. Since poverty is closely related to instability and human rights abuses, especially 
in terms of spurring popular discontent and thus often violent state action, it is an 
important factor in creating conditions for conflicts.  
 
Many scholars are concerned about trade law contributing to poverty and inequality, 
where they hold that although trade has the potential of creating growth and increasing 
income, the current global trade regime is rather a system that upholds existing 
inequalities and further entrenches poverty in the Third World, while benefitting 
multinational companies. Scholars discussing other types of migration like for example 
that of labour, also link trade with migration patterns.127  
 
In this chapter I will discuss two main characteristics of international trade law, the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) and its Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Other bilateral and regional agreements are held to 
actually go further in terms of trade liberalization. However, the purpose of this thesis is 
to take a snap-shot of how international structures of power are disadvantaging the Third 
World, while creating benefits for other states and regions, which in turn has relevance 
for understanding displacement and effective responses to it. Therefore, only the main 
features of the world trade regime will be mentioned and I outline the most salient 
consequences for poverty and migration. Finally, I clarify the main winners and losers 
and explain how the winners continue entrenching poverty while claiming that the current 
trade regime is beneficial for all.   
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A. Legal Overview of the World Trade Organization 
 
The ostensible aim of trade liberalization, especially in context of the establishment of the 
WTO, has been to maximize global economic welfare, which will be enabled through the 
logic of comparative advantage and specialization in cost-efficient production.128 In 
theory, the optimal use of the world’s resources will subsequently raise living standards 
worldwide, in addition to greater employment, growth in incomes, as well as an 
expansion in the production and trade in goods and services.129 The outcome would also 
ensure peace, as trade would enhance realms of mutual interests and cooperation to 
resolve problems.130 This narrative seems promising for those aiming to reduce and 
manage displacement.  
 
Greater developing country integration into the global economy is, according to the G7 
countries, essential in order to achieve economic growth. This is said to require greater 
market access to each others’ economies, requiring the requisite institutional reforms that 
enable this. Liberalization of trade does not only mean lowering tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers to trade – barriers that exist in developed and developing states - but there are a 
number of other legal requirements. Among these we find “compliance with WTO 
requirements on subsidies, intellectual property, customs procedures, sanitary standards 
and policies vis-à-vis foreign investors”. These must be complemented by additional 
reforms in order to ensure the right outcomes, and as such, states must also undertake tax 
reforms in order to compensate for lost tariff revenues, social safety nets for displaced 
workers, as well as labour market reform.131  
 
An essential feature of the international trade regime is the TRIPS agreement, which is 
administered by the WTO. These are rights that “relate to intangibles such as 
information, knowledge, images or signs” where a negative right excludes others from 
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producing an imitation.132 Protection occurs through legal concepts such as patents, 
copyrights and trademarks, as well as plant variety protection, in addition to protecting 
traditional knowledge as well as the data of pharmaceutical companies.133 As TRIPS is 
under the WTO system, this ensures that there is an enforcement mechanism in place.134  
 
 
B. Aims of the Trade Regime 
 
Trade liberalization and economic reforms undertaken in a number of regions and states 
have enabled world trade to expand greatly during the last half century, where global 
exports grew from just under USD 1 trillion a year in 1960, to about USD 10 trillion in 
2008.135 A report by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) demonstrates 
that foreign investment and trade creates more employment, and brings other benefits and 
facilities, as globalization and trade connect consumers, workers and producers in new 
ways.136 Rodrik argues that this type of growth also benefits the poor and points to 
developing countries that have sustained rapid growth in the last decades and experienced 
poverty reduction.137  
 
Although TRIPS has been one of the most controversial elements of the WTO, as will be 
further explained below, those advocating for it hold that intellectual property rights are 
necessary in order to foster innovation. For instance, if pharmaceuticals do not get the 
profit needed for developing costly drugs, there will be few incentives to do so.138  
 
With such positive effects in mind, mainstream scholarship often considers poverty and 
conflict as a local events with local origins, which can be relieved through enhanced 
participation in international trade through the WTO. Pogge, for example, mentions 
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Rawls, who blames the political, religious and philosophical traditions in such countries, 
with their oppressive governments and elites. Poor governance is blamed for creating 
poverty.139 The international trade regime is supposed to rectify such issues. The 
following sections challenge this view, arguing that the way that the system is currently 
organized, it can have negative effects on vulnerable populations, which produces rather 
than prevents displacement. While local factors play a role in creating poverty, placing 
emphasize on such factors alone gives an unbalanced picture of structural inequalities, 
and consequently an incomplete view of migration dynamics. 
 
 
C. Consequences for Third World Countries  
 
Although the international trade regime is held to enable overall prosperity, this has been 
challenged by a number of scholars as well as civil society, where it is held that it rather 
participates in restricting national sovereignty, entrenches poverty, and in general ignores 
the way that currently developed countries were actually able to develop. As such, 
according to Rodrik, various developing countries hold that there is an asymmetry in the 
multilateral trade regime, where a few industrialized countries are dominating the agenda, 
at the expense of the development concerns of most people.140 
 
1. Lack of Sovereignty 
 
One of the consequences of participating in the global trade regime is that state 
sovereignty and decision-making is circumscribed. Chimni and Rodrik hold that in order 
to participate in the international trade regime and thus be allowed market access in the 
North, Third World states are today relinquishing their sovereign economic, social and 
political space to international institutions without having the opportunity to effectively 
participate in the negotiations and decision-making that lead to the adoption of relevant 
treaties.141 In this regards, states are required to adopt uniform global standards in crucial 
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areas “such as agriculture, intellectual property rights (IPR), and regulation of foreign 
investment and services”.  
 
While following the global trade regime, states are unable to formulate or regulate their 
own economic policy that could meet local needs and concerns, and undertake necessary 
reforms that would enable the state to actually benefit from global integration.142 Rodrik 
argues that this “overlooks the important functions that the state must play during the 
process of economic transformation”. In addition, he claims that a more flexible approach 
will benefit all parties.143 However as I explain further below, this perception may be 
challenged as the advanced industrial countries are currently benefiting from the present 
trade regime on expense of the developing countries, and as such, enhanced autonomy for 
Third World states must necessarily reduce such benefits.   
 
Although the erosion of sovereignty counts for all states, it does not have such negative 
effects for developed states as they have the power to shape the policies of international 
institutions, while the Third World does not.144 This is especially due to intense lobbying 
by specific interest groups in the US and Europe, especially multinational corporations. 
Thus, Rodrik and Drahos argue that many of the outcomes of the negotiations are a result 
of this process, and that this works to the detriment of development goals.145 Third World 
countries were side-lined in the WTO talks in Seattle in 1999 as well as towards the 
adoption of the Doha Ministerial Declaration, where Third World opposition was 
silenced by the Northern states, according to Chimni.146 
 
In this way, in addition to the fact that competitive concerns in the industrialized world 
also favour the policies fronted by their multinationals, groups of affluent states are able 
to have their interests translated into international law.147 Although it is held that 
                                                          
142 Chimni, supra note 141 at 7; RODRIK, supra note 129 at 7. 
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developing countries participate in the decision making process,148 I argue that most  
people in developing countries lose, considering the high bargaining power that the 
industrialized countries have. This is because although high-income countries constitute 
only 15.7% of the world’s population, they have 79% of the world’s income. In this way, 
they can afford taking a high price for access to their markets, and can thus have the last 
say in the design of this order149 
 
This initial inequality places into question the claim that poor countries have consented to 
WTO membership, which is in theory voluntary.150 Pogge and Rodrik explain that there is 
no real alternative, as those who do not join the WTO regime face even worse terms, as 
bilateral and regional trade agreement often have worse terms for market access.151 The 
failure of recognizing the underlying power structures that intimately shape bargaining 
power enables the illusion of consent. As mentioned in chapter four, when national 
decision making is eroding, states are vulnerable to the imposition of policies which, 
rather than benefitting the population, are in the interest of outsiders. This has led to 
political and social instability, which in turn affects displacement.  
 
2. Poverty and Lack of Growth 
 
The most important argument against the functioning of the present trade regime, and the 
most valuable for discussing factors of displacement, is that the current system actually 
works to the disadvantage of developing states, while simultaneously benefiting the 
already affluent. This is because the globalization of production is mostly carried out by 
transnational corporations, which are hosted mostly by the EU, Japan and the US, 
although there is an increase in firms from developing economies, albeit with less global 
outreach and presence.152 Those who have benefited the most from globalization and 
trade liberalization are investors, managers, and workers with internationally recognized 
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and sought after education, while workers in sectors that were previously protected by 
trade barriers and smaller enterprisers are the losers.153  
 
In addition, the world’s wealthy countries spend over 300 billion USD a year in 
agricultural subsidies, which thus depresses world prices for agricultural commodities, 
which makes it difficult for small farmers to stay on the land.154 It would not be unlikely 
that these people see the need to migrate to cities and take up employment there, which 
would put pressure on employment in urban areas, prompting some to look for 
employment outside of their country. Finally, Pogge suggests that developing countries 
are competing in a race to the bottom in order to attract foreign investment, which leads 
to human rights abuses where workers are exploited. This is especially due to the lack of 
a minimum wage and global constraints on working hours through the WTO.155 
 
The reason why TRIPS are so controversial is that they undermine a number of essential 
rights by ensuring increased costs of the imitation on design on products. Pogge claims 
that the current rules ensure that poor countries have to pay enormous sums to rich-
country corporations in order to use their intellectual property.156 Consequently, this 
affects for example the right to health, as the patent provisions result in increased 
healthcare costs, which few developing countries can afford. This is because they must 
drive up prices of pharmaceuticals in order to collect rents for the corporations whose 
property rights must be respected. Simultaneously, pharmaceutical companies harvest 
high profits. As such, one-third of the world’s population lack access to essential 
medicines, and curable and preventable diseases are not treated. Intellectual property 
rights are not initially a problem, but the way that they are currently instituted they 
benefit corporations, Third World elites as well as people in the developed countries, 
rather than Third World people.157 Drahos argues that IPRs matter more to long-term 
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growth than other variables,158 and therefore, it has high implications for the possibility to 
combat poverty and to ensure that people do not need to migrate in search for better 
opportunities. High unemployment and poverty is a factor in creation of instability, as 
was seen in the case of Yugoslavia in chapter four.  
 
 
D. Contradicting Claims 
 
It could be expected that a reasonable counterargument is that protectionism has a 
negative effect on world trade and prosperity in general, and that the reason why these 
countries are struggling with poverty and unemployment has to do with local factors like 
bad governance and local inequalities, as mentioned above. There may be something true 
in this allegation, however, it is also interesting to notice that the developed countries 
actually themselves used protectionism as a strategy in order to create economic growth, 
and lowered them only after reaching an advanced stage of economic development. So 
did many developing countries that ‘emerged’, like China, Brazil, and India. The Asian 
Tigers, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, were also allowed by the 
US, eager to have a counterweight to the Soviet Union in the region, to have free access 
to US markets while protecting their own.159 In contrast, Rodrik uses the examples of 
Haiti, which through following all WTO prescriptions, has not achieved anything in 
terms of poverty reduction.160  
 
Currently, developing countries are denied the same strategies, with the claim that this is 
harmful for world trade. Rodrik claims that this “raises serious questions about the 
priority placed on integrationist policies in orthodox reform programmes”.161 This also 
reinforces Chimni’s view that strong patent rights cannot be the “only way to encourage 
invention and innovation”, and that enough profit to encourage this does not have to harm 
the public interest.162 
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Not only have countries developed through such measures, both Pogge and Chimni 
demonstrate that industrialized countries are still allowing protectionist measures for 
themselves.163 Thus, Pogge argues that affluent countries are allowed to “continue 
protecting their markets…in ways that poor countries are not permitted, or cannot afford, 
to match.”164 The consequences is that the affluent countries are receiving an unfair share 
of the global economic growth, where he estimates that developing countries lose 700 
billion USD annually in export opportunities due to such protectionism.165 Chimni claims 
that even in the Doha sessions, which were called the development round, “the 
industrialized world [was] insisting on further tariff concessions from the Third World 
countries” while refusing to reduce its own subsidies in agriculture and textiles.166 Indeed, 
the lack of progress in Doha led to an effective stalemate for progress of the WTO since 
then, leading to a proliferation of bilateral and regional trade agreements instead. 
 
Thus, it becomes clear that the present global institutional order is privileging the affluent 
countries, although other alternatives are available. World trade laws help to create 
poverty and inequality instead of combating it.167  
 
 
E. Privileging Third World Elites 
 
The international trade regime through the WTO is not the only way that suffering is 
institutionalized from an international angle. Rich states put in place, maintain through 
financial and/or military support, and confer legitimacy to corrupt or unrepresentative 
Third World leaders that are likely to do their bidding through allowing them to sell the 
countries’ resources, take up loans on behalf of the country, as well as engaging in 
treaties. When such privileges are conferred the political elites, their actions have 
disastrous effects in countries which are poor but rich in resources,168 and also gives 
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incentives towards “violent acquisition and exercise of political power”. This places the 
responsibility of international actors in concluding treaties and financial transactions with 
undemocratic or corrupt leaders into question.  
 
Corruption has in addition been enabled through bribery of foreign officials, which 
although still occurring, was in OECD countries until 1999 legal business transactions 
where taxes could be deducted. This diverts loyalty from officials in these countries, 
where public contracts are awarded to foreign companies at the expense of the needs of 
the poor.169  
 
 
F. Conclusion 
 
It cannot be denied that international free trade has benefits, innovations and knowledge 
can be shared, and comparative advantages may create more efficient way of dividing 
capital and goods. However, due to pervasive and increasing global inequalities, and thus 
unequal bargaining powers, especially in the WTO but also in relation to bilateral and 
regional trade and investment agreements, certain states and their corporations are able to 
uphold a trade system that furthers their own interests on the expense of other, weaker 
actors. Not only is the present system unjust, but the narrative about growth also furthers 
the idea that all states can increase their income and prosper. This ignores the fact that the 
system does not produce winners without also producing losers. The privileges of the 
most affluent states were built on the misery of others, and the quest for free trade cannot 
be at the expense of scrutinizing this enormous and increasing privilege and affluence. It 
is unlikely that the affluent will give up their privileges voluntarily, which points to why 
their wealth is systemically underplayed and sidelined by international laws that 
ostensibly aim to reduce and eliminate poverty, war, human rights abuses, and 
displacement.  
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VI. The Laws of War: Displacement, Military Intervention, and Post-Conflict 
Statebuilding  
 
It is not unusual for military interventions to exacerbate tensions and displacement as part 
of their immediate effect. However, these negative consequences are justified as 
inevitable immediate costs on the way to a longer term overall benefit. As will be 
evidenced in this chapter, justifications range between halting mass atrocities and human 
rights abuses being committed against a large part of the population, to ensuring 
international peace and security through stabilizing the countries in questions, in addition 
to halting the flows of refugees moving into neighbouring states. Furthermore, military 
interventions have other consequences and aims not related to the intervention itself, 
which is worthy of attention and critique: the consequent administration of the state 
intervened in, where the international community and institutions take the lead in deep 
intervention that transforms the concerned states from within.  
 
As will be argued in this chapter, both military intervention as well as the post-conflict 
statebuilding can sometimes have disastrous and destabilizing effects on these states and 
peoples, which in the long term risks further displacement. I furthermore argue that the 
states involved in both direct military intervention as well as the post-conflict 
statebuilding are obfuscating their role in creating displacement, through the narrative of 
peace, security and human rights.  
 
I start with a basic introduction to when the use of military force is permitted under 
international law. I then outline the direct effects of military interventions, as well as how 
intervening states justify infringing on the sovereignty of other states and people. 
Moreover, I attempt to discuss negative consequences of the post-conflict statebuilding 
process. In this section, I hold that this also affects the sovereignty of the state in 
question, as the rebuilding is often made on the intervener’s premises and thus tailored 
according to their interests, rather than the subject state’s needs. This is significant to the 
issue of displacement because, as has been seen in chapter four and five, such policies 
often lead to poverty, destabilization and conflict. 
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A. Legal Overview 
 
Military intervention, the use of force, is “one of the most controversial areas of 
international law,” and is sanctioned by the UN Charter Chapter VII.170  The use of force 
is prohibited by Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, and its main exceptions are a state’s right 
to self-defence under Article 51, and the use of force authorized by the Security Council 
under Chapter VII.171 
 
Humanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine claim to 
protect civilians and end gross human rights violations in the target state. It is 
controversial whether humanitarian intervention is legal, however a number of states 
have used these doctrines while carrying out military interventions, among them the 
NATO action over Kosovo in 1999 and the intervention in Libya in 2011.172   
 
The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) formulated 
the concept of the R2P doctrine in its report in 2001, which was endorsed by the UN 
General Assembly 2005.173  This doctrine has three elements; the responsibility to 
prevent, react and rebuild. It is more than just military intervention, as it extends to a 
wider framework of obligations, preventing conflict through political, diplomatic, legal, 
economic and security means. The rationale is that the international community should 
address root causes and direct causes of conflicts where prevention as the most important 
dimension should always be exhausted before any intervention is considered through the 
Security Council, including providing assistance for post-conflict reconstruction.174 This 
controversial doctrine serves as an important illustration to my argument because, as will 
be explained below, its putatively noble intent can camouflage negative consequences for 
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Third World people, and demonstrates how states and international institutions can 
obfuscate their responsibility for institutionalizing suffering and exploitation of the Third 
World, thus ensuring that there is no need to take responsibility for the consequent 
displacement.  
 
 
B.  Immediate Effects of Intervention 
 
This chapter examines the long-term effects of intervention. Military intervention, 
whether classified as humanitarian or not, can lead to displacement, even when it has as 
its core purpose stemming displacement by stopping atrocities that are causing mass 
movement. As an example, Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, and Libya have all faced external 
intervention, with major consequences for displacement. Although Syria may not be 
subject to intervention sanctioned by international law, all the big powers are intervening 
there through provision of arms, money and military training.175 These continue being 
countries or origin or transit for a number of refugees reaching Europe today. 
 
Although the NATO bombing in Kosovo was intended to halt the civil war occurring, it 
is estimated that between 400,000 to 500,000 people were displaced between the start of 
the campaign until the Yugoslav forces withdrew 3 months later.176 Another example is 
Afghanistan, which has suffered a number of interventions and civil conflicts since the 
Soviet invasion in 1979, and the most recent intervention led by the US in 2001 
compounded the existing refugee crisis, where hundreds of thousands of civilians were 
displaced.177 In Iraq, nearly 200,000 people were displaced following the intervention led 
by the US and the UK in 2003.178 As will be mentioned below, this intervention led 
ultimately to one of the largest refugee crises in the world 2007,179 a crisis which has still 
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not receded.180 Although claimed to have been successful by many and having averted a 
bloodbath, others hold that the NATO intervention in Libya in 2011, following a Security 
Council resolution, created the conditions for the start of the civil war,181 prompting over 
a million people from 120 nationalities residing in the country to seek refugee outside of 
the country.182 Syria is currently the largest refugee population under UNHCR’s mandate, 
with 4 million hosted by neighbouring countries, and 7.6 million IDPs.183  
 
 
C. International Law Justification for Military Intervention 
 
Military interventions are justified by pro-interventionists in a number of ways, including 
saving people from gross human rights abuses like genocide due to alleged Third World 
backwardness, the pursuit of world security, as well as shoring up refugee flows before 
they reach Europe, or other developed countries. In such situations it is usually held that 
there were no other options, and that the international community could not stand by and 
watch thousands of people suffer. In this way, displacement is seen as an unfortunate, but 
necessary, consequence, in the pursuit of a higher aim for peace. According to the same 
narrative, such displacement would not have occurred if the local government had 
behaved responsibly in the first place. However, as will be shown in this chapter, despite 
ostensibly noble reasoning, interventions are very costly and are rarely carried out 
without particular interests for the interveners in mind. As such, the way that the states 
are administered in the time following the military intervention may cause as much harm 
as the intervention is claiming to prevent.  
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1. Saving People from Human Rights Abuses, World Security, and Third 
World Backwardness 
 
One of the main justifications for military interventions in other states is that gross human 
suffering is taking place. Ethnic tension, civil war, religious turmoil, flows of arms, 
economic inequalities, population pressures, ecological disasters are used by the 
interveners as a pretext and for military intervention.184 The call to save Third World 
people from mass atrocities is fuelled by the narrative of the powerless Third World 
people, victims of their uncivilized leaders, where the international community, that is, 
the West, is their saviour. Orford analyses that people and states are portrayed as 
primitive and barbaric, unable to govern themselves, and as such the Third World 
becomes a problem needing to be solved through international intervention.185 
 
Intervention is further justified through redefining the concept of state sovereignty, which 
places the prime responsibility to protect citizens at the hands of the state. While 
intervention violates international law and undermines the UN charter, the lack of 
intervention in the event of mass atrocities is considered by many to be just as grave 
ethically. Chandler suggests that the R2P doctrine attempts to solve this dilemma by 
redefining sovereignty in terms of a state’s responsibility to protect its people from 
human rights abuse rather than political autonomy. In that way, it would according to this 
doctrine be justified to intervene in the event of mass atrocities, as the sovereign state did 
not fulfil its responsibility to protect its citizens required by the redefined concept of 
sovereignty.186  
 
The Third World is portrayed in security texts as a major threat to international security, 
which must be acted against in order to secure world peace and stability. This is 
especially because intra-state conflict and state collapse is portrayed as the most pressing 
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problem of global security.187 According to Orford, the pro-interventionist narrative 
argues that the failure to act against such issues would be seen to betray the main purpose 
of the established international order.188 As such, the images of the chaotic Third World 
incapable of governing itself makes coercive intervention considered to be desirable 
mean to contain the crisis of disorder and fragmentation, thus upholding an efficient 
world order.189  As this is considered a mostly local problem, statebuilding is seen as an 
appropriate solution.190  
 
The narrative of saving Third World people and the quest for international security is 
ultimately based on the notion that the international community is the guarantor of values 
like peace, freedom, justice and human rights, which must be upheld at all costs in order 
to rescue the oppressed. In this way, according to Orford, the need for human rights and 
democracy thus gives an alibi for enhanced international presence in many countries, 
including military actions like aerial bombardment.191 This heroic narrative ignores the 
international community’s domination and exploitation of the Third World through 
military and economic intervention, which is part of the reason for the emergence of 
security and humanitarian crises.192 In that way, these actions’ role in creating conditions 
for more displacement is hidden from sight, as any resulting displacement is an 
unfortunate consequence in order to reach the noble cause.  
 
2. Shoring up Refugee Flows 
 
Finally and most importantly, intervention is often legitimized through its call to stop 
refugee flows and as a humanitarian call to assist those displaced by Third World state 
violence. I argue that such actions are rather a pretext to ensure that refugees do not reach 
developed countries, and are not aimed at improving the lives of refugees as such.  
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According to Roberts, refugee communities are sometimes seen as a threat to 
international peace and security themselves. He argues that international military action 
as well as other assistance by international organizations have prevented or reversed 
refugee flows,193  despite the opposite also occurring.194 He claims that a number of 
Security Council resolutions in the 1990s legitimated similar threats as grounds for 
intervention.195  
 
Orford criticizes this use of humanitarian intervention as it rather aims to prevent the 
exodus of refugees, not to end their suffering, as refugees inspire fear as much as 
compassion. Thus, the intervention is carried out in order to uphold the separation of the 
developed world and suffering masses, which in Orford’s words serves to “distance the 
colonized from the colonizer”.196 As such, humanitarian intervention responds to crises 
that have brought the Other, the refugee, too close, in order to ensure that they are unable 
to seek asylum,197 particularly in the North. In this way, it could be assumed that 
interventions and policy choices during assistance are more tailored with the aim of 
ensuring refugees do not leave, rather than emphasizing their well-being and needs.  
 
As explained in chapter four and five, many developed states are, through economic and 
trade law, responsible for creating conditions for conflict and displacement. Military 
intervention in the pretext of shoring up refugees in the Third World thus becomes a way 
to ensure that responsibility for this never has to be taken, as the refugee will not be able 
to reach these states in order to apply for asylum. The irony is that military intervention 
creates even more displacement both through the military action itself, as well as by 
enabling the international community to impose economic and trade policies favourable 
to the interveners through post-conflict statebuilding.  
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D. The Aftermath of the Intervention: Rebuilding of the State 
 
The international community is also creating displacement through post-conflict 
statebuilding, as it enables the intervening states to continue exercising control over the 
state in question, through rebuilding the state according to their own interests, often at the 
expense of the interests of the state and the people. Thus, actual military intervention is a 
small but essential part of the international community’s involvement in the states 
concerned, as it is the means by which other types of interventions occur. While some of 
the ensuing activities may create positive effects in intervened countries, I argue that 
many also serve the interest of hegemonic powers and institutions, which has as its 
consequence the destabilization and continuous dependency of these states. Thus, post-
conflict statebuilding in many ways serves to undermine the very values that it allegedly 
promotes, and the result is continuous trends of displacement, while the intervening states 
can hide behind the claims of technical and financial assistance. 
 
1. Loss of Sovereignty while Retaining Responsibility 
 
Through statebuilding, the intervening powers are able to increase international influence 
deep into the economic, legal and political structures of Third World states. Such 
interventions are made possible as the international community is seen as a civilizing 
administrator, where Third World peoples are assumed not to know what is best for them 
or how democracy works. The international community, including international 
institutions, gain power over internal governance mechanisms in these states, which 
replaces the need for external pressure.198 Through the R2P doctrine’s redefinition of state 
responsibility, the intervening states and institutions shift the responsibility of any 
potential failures and shortcomings onto the Third World state.199 This new focus on the 
state ensures that the interveners have less responsibility, while still being able to 
intervene and rebuild the state on behalf of the locals.200 The relationship becomes 
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coercive through a fictitious partnership, forcing the non-Western state to cede its 
sovereign powers,201 although it superficially looks like a voluntary form of 
imperialism.202  
 
As such, post-intervention reconstruction has the capacity to entrench an unjust 
international economic order and neo-colonial forms of governance.203 Orford explains 
how the UN and the World Bank acted as a trustee while taking over the administration 
in East Timor in the transition to independence, which created conditions for a limited 
sovereignty similar to the Mandate System under the League of Nations, which was a 
new colonialism based on economic control.204  
 
In Afghanistan we find a similar narrative, where Afghan representatives set out the plan 
for governance in Bonn under the auspices of the UN, while the World Bank, the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Asian Development Bank decided on 
how to transform Afghanistan into a market economy.205 Orford thinks that the role 
played by the international community in such situations is at odds with actual self-
determination, even if this is the claimed purpose.206  
 
As explained in chapter four, the lack of sovereignty forces the state to accept policies 
and legislation that favour international institutions, states and corporations rather than to 
the benefit of the people of concern, which has led to poverty, destabilization and human 
rights abuses, as explained in the case of Yugoslavia.  
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2. Markets, Trade and Economic Policies 
 
Through various components of statebuilding, intervention by the international 
community serves to change trade and economic policies which open up markets to 
foreign investors. Although this can have positive effects for the states involved, with 
enhanced integration into the global economy, I argue that as this is carried out by 
international actors, it is highly unlikely that it is done while disregarding these actors’ 
own interests. This is confirmed by Orford, holding that since“[p]ost-conflict 
reconstruction [is] carried out under the auspices of international financial institutions” 
this rather enables continued exploitation, as their concern is to “create a secure 
environment in which foreign investment can produce profits for the shareholders of 
multinational and foreign corporations.”207 She explains how critics argued during the 
reconstruction of East Timor that it, under UN and WB management, was a paradise for 
market driven foreign investors.208 The policies of international financial institutions and 
trade law, and their effect on displacement have been explained in chapter four and five 
respectively.  
 
Nevertheless, international institutions that have been involved in creating displacement 
continue to have a prominent role in post-conflict reconstruction. Evans, co-chair of the 
ICISS, asserts that international financial institutions like the IMF should have a central 
role in economic development and currency stabilization,209 which I argue ignores the 
fact that, as explained in chapter four, IMF reforms have contributed to conflict and 
displacement rather than to peace. If the international administration that is imposed 
through the concepts of military intervention and the consequent rebuilding of the state 
aims to facilitate such reforms, it can hardly be argued that it serves to protect people or 
to prevent new conflicts from erupting. Orford claims that this is partly because the 
international legal literature that celebrates achievements of post-intervention 
reconstruction fails to criticize the economic order that is imposed through this process.210 
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Solutions proposed by the international community that have actually contributed to 
destabilization and conflict previously are rarely discussed, and as such, the power 
relations between the Third World and the West is made obscure, where the hero of the 
story is the intervener, usually the UN Security Council, NATO, or a US-led coalition.211 
I argue that the narrative of peace and assistance removes from view the role that 
powerful states have in creating displacement, thus making it look like only the local 
governments are at fault. This enables these states to continue intervening, rather than 
changing the international system of domination or offering asylum. 
 
3. The Example of Iraq 
 
As an example of international intervention and administration leading to conflict rather 
than mitigating it, is the US/UK intervention in Iraq in 2003 and the following work 
towards rebuilding the state. The displacement of the Iraqis has been one of the largest 
displacement crises during the last half century, and has resulted in profound and 
irreversible changes in the Iraqi society and politics.  
 
During the preparations for the US-led invasion, it was assumed that large displacement 
of the Iraqi people would follow. However, this did not materialize, and only around 
190,000 Iraqis were displaced between 2003 and 2005, leading to aid workers packing up 
and leaving for more important crises.212 Nevertheless, after a few years of occupation 
and failed American efforts to rebuild the country, a sectarian civil war broke out in 
2006. Displacement increased greatly, 213 reaching around 2.4 million IDPs in Iraq by the 
end of 2007,214 and around 1.7 to 2.3 million took refuge in neighbouring countries by the 
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end of 2008.215 The Iraqi refugee crisis was considered the world’s second in terms of 
numbers in 2008.216  
 
Given that the displacement was mainly carried out by local militia groups and was due 
to the civil war where the society started fragmenting along ethnic and sectarian lines,217 
this displacement may seem nothing more than locally induced, although the invasion a 
few years earlier could merely have triggered already underlying ethnic tension and 
quests for power.218 However, others hold that it was due to the statebuilding processes 
initiated by the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which dismantled and 
rebuilt the state from the bottom. The US led administration was able to dismantle the 
nationalist cohesion in Iraq in a number of ways, among them the process of de-
Ba’athification,219 dismantling of the military, encouraging a state set-up along ethnical 
and sectarian lines, as well as contributing to security gaps and economic hardships 
which led people to seek protection by militias.220 As has been seen, the result was 
disastrous with millions displaced and unable to return to their homes.  
 
 
E. Conclusion  
 
Military intervention does not only lead to displacement in the immediate aftermath, but 
the work towards rebuilding the state according to the interveners’ preferences and favour 
also plays an important role in triggering displacement in the long run. Through calls for 
respect for human rights and international security, while claiming that the Third World 
peoples with their brutal regimes are incapable of independent government, the West, 
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including European countries, engage in deep structural and administrative changes in the 
concerned states. This is often claimed to be on behalf of the Third World people 
themselves, which are in need of rescue. Under such a narrative, it seems reasonable that 
intervention is necessary as well as welcomed by local populations. The international 
community claims that they are equipping the new state with tools that will enable self-
government.  
 
However, external players are making key administrative decisions for these states, 
creating an uneasy relationship between international administration on one side, and 
self-determination on the other. While the decisions made are often aimed at entering the 
new state into a global economy, this is carried out to the benefit of the interveners and 
international institutions they control. As a consequence, real democracy and decision 
making is not present, while simultaneously a number of the decisions taken entrench 
existing inequalities, which further leads to destabilization of the state and society. 
Accordingly, the international community is itself part of creating the conditions for 
conflict and displacement, despite this being the initial claimed reason for intervention.  
 
 
 
 
VII. Climate Change Induced Displacement 
 
One of the main factors for contemporary and future displacement is climate change and 
environmental degradation. Rising sea levels, change in local weather conditions causing 
drought and cyclones, as well as deforestation, desertification, in addition to loss in 
livelihoods and agricultural production and lack of food security, prompt people to 
migrate in order to improve their livelihoods, or even to save their lives.  
 
Although migration and displacement is affected by a number of factors, climate change 
can make people leave their homes both as a direct or an indirect reason. This is because 
climate change may result in increased tensions and conflict over scarce resources, and as 
such, indirectly result in displacement.  
 
I argue that international laws on the environment and on population movement do not 
clearly make a link between those who cause environmentally-induced displacement and 
the responsibility they should take for it. As such, the current international laws on 
migration and the environment allow rich states to escape the issue of responsibility for 
displacement, even though the most affluent states are responsible for most of the CO2 
emissions. It is for example unclear whether, under international law, states responsible 
for climate change should reduce emissions, or provide asylum, fund adaption measures, 
or provide compensation, or do a combination of these things, in order to alleviate 
displacement.  
 
This chapter will outline the main international laws that address climate change and 
displacement, showing that the link between the two types of laws is non-existent, and 
that consequently most solutions are geared towards local adaption measures. Next, I 
explain how climate change directly and indirectly causes displacement through reducing 
livelihoods and spurring conflict. Thereafter, the main CO2 emitting states will be 
identified, as well as the main reasons for climate change. Finally, I look at how cuts in 
emissions are discouraged due to the continuous demand for growth, and consider how 
this, in addition to the lack of other mitigation measures for refugees, leaves refugees in a 
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limbo with no responsibility taken for them, whether asylum, cut in emissions, or types of 
local assistance and adaptation.  
 
 
A. Legal Overview 
 
1. International Environmental Law 
 
International Environmental Law (IEL) deals with a range of issues that are important 
causes of displacement, including climate change, deforestation, desertification, 
biodiversity loss, water scarcity, pollution and hazardous wastes. Many of the 
environmental agreements aim for sustainable resource use, as well as constraints on the 
commercial exploitation of scarce resources, through the overarching principle of 
sustainable development. However, progress in such agreements has been limited.221 
Natarajan and Khoday hold that this is affecting the poor the most, as “access to clean air, 
water, food, and sustainable livelihoods becomes more precarious.”222   
 
Although IEL deals with a number of issues affecting displacement, it does not deal with 
the issue directly. The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
provides, however, that parties assist economically developing states vulnerable to 
adverse effects of climate change. This provision is recalled in the Kyoto Protocol but it 
is not clear how this is supposed to be carried out.223 Mayer also demonstrates that 
regional and bilateral negotiations removes the burden of climate change induced 
migration from the historical responsibility for climate change, as it seems like countries 
would prefer to pay their way out of it and rather attempt to solve the problem inside of 
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developing countries rather than offering relocation programmes.224 Finally, attempts to 
introduce displacement into the agenda for climate talks in Paris were rejected and thus 
displacement is not mentioned in the Paris Convention, which shows the refusal in taking 
such responsibility.225  
 
The lack of clear responsibility from developed states is in contradiction to the principle 
of common but differentiated responsibility for the global environment, an important 
principle of equity in IEL. The principle is mentioned both in the Rio Declaration and the 
Kyoto Protocol, and is a “manifestation of general principles of equity in international 
law.”226 This concept attempts to set up flexible mechanisms acknowledging the fact that 
the most serious climate change and environmental impacts are affecting developing 
states, which have the least historical responsibility for causing it, in addition to having 
less economic and technical capacity to tackle such problems. Therefore, this principle 
stipulates that states that cause environmental harm, and those states that have better 
economic and technological capacity, should bear a greater burden as well as take the 
lead for solutions.227   
 
2. International Refugee Law and Migration in International Law 
 
International refugee law and other international laws governing the movement of people 
do not address environmentally induced migration, and as such the issue of climate 
change is left up to IEL. Natural disasters are not a part of the 1951 Refugee Convention, 
which does not mention environmental change at all. People displaced by environmental 
reasons can only be recognized as refugees if they can demonstrate that after a drought, 
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famine or other environmental disasters they will have a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted because of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, 
or political opinion.228 Otherwise, if they cross an international border, they are left to the 
host state’s domestic migration law. As such, they are usually considered economic 
migrants which, as mentioned in chapter three, ensures that developed states have 
minimal obligations towards them and wide discretion in how they are dealt with. 
Therefore, in general, although people in some regions seek assistance abroad, most 
people fleeing disasters remain in their own country,229 where they are under the mercy of 
their own state.   
 
Also, at the EU level, there is no distinct instrument for environmentally displaced 
people, although according to the UNHCR, some EU member states are explicitly 
considering environmentally displaced individuals.230 As an example, Finland and 
Sweden have adopted domestic legal provisions granting subsidiary protection to anyone 
who, “by reason of an environmental catastrophe, cannot return to his home country.”231  
 
However, most solutions proposed relate to enhancing the resilience of the people most 
vulnerable to climate change, which means assisting people in the Third World through 
adaptation strategies.232 Developed have agreed to participate with 100 billion USD per 
year by 2020 through the Paris Agreement, however, until now the Green Climate Fund 
has raised 10.2 billion USD only,233 which indicate that the actual assistance is highly 
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inadequate. In conclusion, it is clear that international law is poorly equipped to deal with 
the challenge of people displaced by climate change. 
 
 
B. The Challenge of Climate Change 
 
Climate change is becoming a main defining force of human development in the coming 
century,234 as human activity is placing a strain on the functions of the earth that 
ecosystems may not be able to sustain future generations.235 There is a limit to how much 
carbon dioxide the earth can absorb without creating dangerous climate change effects, 
which we are currently moving dangerously close to.236 Climate change is expected to 
include more extreme weather, which is already happening. This will affect all 
countries,237 and includes impacts on the ecology, changed weather systems and local 
rainfall patterns, storms, floods, droughts, change in temperature, melting glaciers, 
desertification and rising sea levels.238  
 
In addition to climate change, excessive consumption levels lead to air pollution, 
deforestation, soil erosion and hazardous waste.239 In this chapter I am focusing on 
human-induced climate change, as the phenomenon is unprecedented in human history. 
However, it is necessary to keep in mind that serious displacement effects also occur with 
regard to other environmental problems governed by IEL regimes for desertification, 
deforestation, species extinction.240  
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One of the main consequences of climate change is its negative effect on food security, 
which is crucial in migration decisions. Climate change affects water provisions, 
agriculture and global fish stocks, and consequently the price of food. Saul argues that 
“the price of staple foods has increased by 80% over the past three years” and 100 million 
people pushed into poverty over the last two years.241 He asserts that “[c]limate change 
will aggravate the underlying causes of water scarcity in Asia,”242 and that 10-20 per cent 
of drylands are already degraded on a global level. Over 2 billion people in dry and semi-
dry areas are vulnerable to loss of crucial resources like water supply, which is expected 
to further intensify during climate change.243  
 
Although the consequences of past consumption patterns are already materializing, 
disastrous changes will occur in the next century if this development is not halted.244 
Whereas climate change will affect all people and states and nobody will be immune to 
the consequences, the wealthier will be able to mitigate many of the risks.245 Developing 
states in general, and the poorest people in particular, are more vulnerable to climate 
change, especially due to geographic vulnerability as well as less ability to adapt and 
mitigate risk.246  
 
 
C. Displacement Dynamics with Relation to Climate Change 
 
As the intensity and frequency of extreme weather will be increasing, climate change will 
exacerbate current displacement trends.247 The report Global Estimates published by 
Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 
(IDMC) demonstrates that after adjusting for population growth, the displacement 
associated with disasters has increased by 60 percent from the 1970s. Thus, we can see a 
steady upward trend in displacement. This is however not related to climate change 
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alone, but also to increased urbanization and economic vulnerability.248 The Advisory 
Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility suggests that around 175 million people 
in developing countries have been displaced by disasters.249 There are a number of 
estimations related to future displacement, and it is held that many of them are not taking 
migration dynamics into account.250 Numbers of potential environmental migrants by 
2050 vary between 50 million and 350 million, where the most cited estimate is 200 
million.251  
 
Migration and displacement depends on the type of environmental hazard in question. 
The elements mentioned in the previous paragraphs like sea level rise, drought, 
desertification and other environmental stressors can lead to migration both directly and 
indirectly, and as such they are not always the main cause of migration, but affects the 
process through other means, like through spurring armed conflicts over decreasing 
resources. Other factors like floods and tornados create emergency situations where 
people flee immediately to save their lives, hazards which are expected to increase due to 
climate change.252 Rising sea levels is expected to become an important factor in future 
displacement, where small island states and low-lying coastal areas will be particularly 
affected and people will be forced to move abroad.253 The link between climate change 
and displacement can thus sometimes be difficult to identify, especially in the slow-onset 
events.254  
 
As climate change results in resource scarcity, this may very well result in conflict, which 
is one of the main drivers of displacement. With lower agricultural production, restricted 
food supply and higher energy prices, resource scarcity often leads to violence when 
there are no other way of securing essential needs.255 Saul argues that the World Bank 
“estimates that 33 countries are at risk of political destabilization and internal conflict due 
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to food price inflation.”256 Furthermore, structural weaknesses of states will be aggravated 
by impacts of climate change, as many states like Nigeria, Sudan, Kenya and Ghana are 
already engaged in conflicts over land and resources, where desertification has been one 
of the reasons. These are countries where many refugees originate from. Thus, climate 
change and environmental hazards intensify other underlying causes of conflict.257 In 
such cases refugees may have a better chance of applying for asylum as the direct cause 
is not climate change itself, that is, if they are able to cross an international border.   
 
It is important to consider environmental factors together with other socio-economic 
dynamics while looking at decisions to migrate, as well as the ability to adapt. Several 
non-climate factors need to be taken into account, like social and economic exclusion, 
demographic developments and institutional constraints as well as overpopulated 
settlements, overuse of natural resources and deforestation. Poverty and insecurity is 
often interrelated with environmental factors when people decide to move,258 and as such 
availability to coping mechanisms, which the industrialized countries have, is crucial.259 It 
is generally accepted that multiple and overlapping causes and motivations affect 
migration flows, and that they do not have one single cause, and many reinforce each 
other.260 Therefore, the decision to migrate in response to environmental change is 
complex.261 Consequently, solutions for climate refugees will need to take all these 
elements into account.  
 
 
D. Main Reasons for Climate Change and the Continuous Demand for Growth 
 
Climate change is mainly happening due to an increasing overconsumption and 
exploitation of the earth’s resources in order to maintain ever higher levels of 
consumption, a pattern initiated by the industrial revolution. Burning of fossil fuels is 
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responsible for around half of the CO2 emissions, and the three main activities that have 
led to climate change are power generation, transport and deforestation. This places 
enormous pressures on the earth’s ecological systems, on which humanity depends. It is 
estimated that humanity now uses the resources of 1.3 earths, or a third more of earth’s 
capacity than what is available.262  
 
As will be explained to a further extent below, only a very small proportion of the 
world’s population has created climate change. As an example, the Human Development 
Report held in 2007 that the UK with a population of 60 million emits more than Egypt, 
Nigeria, Pakistan and Vietnam together, which had a population of 472 million that year. 
China is a major emitter of CO2, but when the emissions are calculated per capita, they 
are just one fifth of the size of that of the United States.263 
 
Overconsumption is related to the persistent demand for increasing growth, which is in 
sharp contradiction to the need for cuts in CO2 emissions, both in developed and 
developing countries. This ‘growth doctrine’ is an essential reason why IEL is unable to 
find real solutions for climate change, and thus for mitigating displacement. UNDP 
argues that economic growth is one of the most powerful driver of emission trends.264 
Consumerism is promoted in order to have the economy going, thus as a development 
strategy promoted by governments world-wide.265 Natarajan and Khoday argue that the 
natural environment is “fundamental to economic development” where nature is 
considered something to be controlled, extracted and a form of capital, and that our 
control over nature is perceived as limitless. IEL, as well as international law in general, 
continues to understand nature primarily as a source of wealth that we should control, 
rather than an essential condition underlying our existence.266   
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Areas of law other than IEL continue promoting activities which lead to emissions, and 
thus form a large obstacle to attempts by IEL to encourage cuts in this regard. Natarajan 
and Khoday hold that while IEL attempts to protect the environment, other interests and 
areas of international law continue to promote consumption and resource extraction, 
especially as the regulation of natural resources is kept out of IEL.  
 
In its quest for achieving consensus, IEL looks for environmentally friendly options for 
growth, while the problem is the logic of growth itself.267 This logic has led us to rely 
primarily on trade and economy based solutions for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
Stallworthy argues that these have limited effect, as they maintain the “fossil-centered 
industrial model,” which would just relocate manufacturing and distribution processes 
elsewhere.268 Through other areas of law, industries are subsidized, like the transportation 
and energy sectors, where cheap oil and electricity enhance production and consumption. 
Business lobbies and policy makers stimulate consumerism and lobby for legislation that 
stimulates it as well.269 Thus, IEL fails to stop ecological harm, which is particularly 
noted in the failures to reach any significant agreements in negotiations.270  
 
Consequently, in the stalemate between continuous demand for growth and climate 
change, refugees are left with the consequences while the states that not only are the 
largest polluters, but also have the key to change,271  are reluctant to deal with this issue. 
This can be noticed through the fact that cuts in emissions are not legally binding, but 
voluntary under the Paris Agreement.272 
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financial capabilities to achieve deep and early cuts in emissions.” 
272 Adoption of the Paris Agreement, supra note 223. 
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E. States with the Largest Ecological Footprints  
 
It is uncontroversial that the richest countries are the main consumers and CO2 emitters 
and thus have the deepest carbon footprints. This does not mean that countries from the 
developing world are not making a carbon footprint, however the main responsibility 
rests with the developed world.  
 
From 1840 to 2004, the highest accumulated emissions come from the United States with 
just below 30%, followed by Russia (8%), China (8%), Germany (7%) and the United 
Kingdom (4%). The following countries are Japan, France, India, Canada and Poland, 
and as such, the rich countries dominate the cumulative emissions account. If we look at 
the carbon footprint of the EU countries together, they are responsible for around 20%.273 
As a contrast, most developing countries have significantly lower emissions. Assadourian 
estimates that the world’s richest 500 million “are currently responsible for 50 percent of 
the world’s carbon dioxide emissions, while the poorest 3 billion are responsible for just 
6 percent.274  
 
The discrepancies between developing and developed countries with regards to CO2 
emissions, where the developed countries bear the main responsibility, contradicts the 
fact that the world’s poor carry most of the burden from climate change.275 Taking into 
account the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, it is reasonable to 
expect that European states take a greater responsibility of cutting emissions, while also 
offering solutions for those who will nevertheless inevitably be displaced due to ongoing 
climate events.  
 
 
F. Conclusion  
 
Despite the richest countries having the deepest carbon footprints, legal responsibility for 
climate refugees is non-existent. Although these states have the ability to generate 
                                                          
273 UNDP, supra note 234 at 40–41. 
274 Assadourian, supra note 235 at 6. 
275 UNDP, supra note 234 at 43. 
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change, international law ensures that there is no real cuts in emissions, especially with 
the continuing demand for growth and production. This, coupled with no international 
protection for climate change induced refugees, means that most contemporary solutions 
relate to enhancing the resilience of the people most vulnerable to climate change, which 
means assisting people in the Third World through mitigation and adaptation strategies. 
This is indeed necessary. However, I argue that such solutions clearly point to the fact 
that developed states are refusing to take appropriate responsibility for people displaced 
by climate change, which is due to no link between climate change and displacement in 
either IRL or IEL. Although calls for such a link have been made, they have been actively 
ignored.  
 
 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
 
This thesis argues that the European bias of IRL, coupled with closed European borders 
and aid to third countries, ensures that refugees are contained in the Third World, out of 
Europe’s responsibility. Most importantly, I argue that European states, like many other 
developed countries, themselves take part in creating conditions for displacement in the 
Third World, while simultaneously refusing to take responsibility for them. This is made 
possible as the link between IRL and other legal regimes like trade, economic policies, 
military intervention and environmental law is non-existent.  
 
The consequences of making such a link is that Europe’s role in institutionalizing 
suffering and exploitation in the Third World becomes evident. Europe, like other 
powerful states, is through international law carefully creating a narrative where it 
portrays the international community (i.e. affluent states) as the savior enforcing 
necessary policies for the benefit of a Third World incapable of governing itself. 
Although local factors also play an important role in creating displacement, and are in 
fact often the direct cause, I hold that it is highly problematic that the international 
community obfuscates any potential link between its own actions and displacement. 
Thus, the international community avoids the responsibility for refugees, whether this is 
through asylum, adequate compensation or any attempt to alter the global unequal 
system.  
 
The disconnection between causes and consequences of displacement ensures that 
genuine solutions for displacement cannot be found, as they relate to the unequal power 
structures within international law itself, where those in power are unwilling to let go of 
their privileges. As such, human rights abuses, poverty, conflict, and climate change will 
continue displacing people until such issues are solved at the root, which cannot happen 
until states with the largest influence over international law acknowledge their 
responsibility. Therefore, although softer border controls and more assistance would be 
helpful, such solutions are far from adequately addressing the real problem. As a 
consequence, current European and other countries’ policies on asylum are clearly 
74 
 
misplaced. It becomes clear that these policies are not aimed at solving the refugee issue, 
but rather to ensure that the exploitation and suffering that is caused by the international 
community is hidden from sight and physically located elsewhere. In such a situation, 
large numbers of people in the Third World are left to suffer in less than adequate 
conditions, while Europeans can continue buttressing their lives of incredible privilege.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
